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WHAT THEN MUST WE DO?: WHY RUBIN v. 
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN LEAVES 
VICTIMS OF STATE SPONSORED TERROR 
ATTACKS WITH FEW GOOD OPTIONS 
Abstract: The United States Supreme Court should have expanded § 1610(g) of 
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act to allow United States victims of foreign 
state sponsored terror attacks to file attachments against any kind of property 
owned by a foreign government. This would have provided victims with a viable 
opportunity to execute the judgments of United States courts against foreign state 
defendants. Without an expanded § 1610(g), victims will continue to be trapped 
without any realistic path to recover the full amount of damages they have sus-
tained. 
INTRODUCTION 
On the afternoon of September 4, 1997, three individuals walked into a 
busy pedestrian shopping center on Ben Yehuda Street in downtown Jerusa-
lem.1 Once they were in position and within sight of one another, all three at-
tackers—including one disguised as a woman and another as an elderly man—
detonated shrapnel-filled bombs attached to their bodies.2 The blasts ripped 
through the crowded street, killing four people and injuring around two hun-
dred more.3 Among the injured were eight U.S. citizens, including a woman 
named Jenny Rubin.4 Hamas, a Palestinian terror organization that received 
                                                                                                                           
 1 Campuzano v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 281 F. Supp. 2d 258, 261 (D.D.C. 2003); 143 CONG. 
REC. H6804 (daily ed. Sept. 4, 1997) (statement of Rep. Snowbarger); 1997: Suicide Bombings Put 
Peace in Doubt, BBC (Sept. 4, 1997), http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/september/4/
newsid_2499000/2499009.stm [https://perma.cc/JSA5-RG3Q]; 7 Killed by Bomb Blasts in Jerusalem, 
CNN (Sept. 4, 1997, 10:02 PM), https://web.archive.org/web/20180814065728/http://www.cnn.com/
WORLD/9709/04/israel.blast.930/ [https://perma.cc/5PFD-RZHV]; Yair Sheleg, A Short History of 
Terror, HAARETZ (Dec. 3, 2001, 12:00 AM), https://www.haaretz.com/1.5482716 [https://perma.
cc/7DZW-VMR4]. 
 2 Serge Schmemann, 3 Bombers in Suicide Attack Kill 4 on Jerusalem Street in Another Blow to 
Peace, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 5, 1997), http://www.nytimes.com/1997/09/05/world/3-bombers-in-suicide-
attack-kill-4-on-jerusalem-street-in-another-blow-to-peace.html [https://perma.cc/39EC-Z45X]. The 
attacks occurred weeks after a similar but more explosive bomb detonated on July 30 in another 
neighborhood of Jerusalem, killing fifteen. Id. See infra note 84 and accompanying text, for more 
information about the victims, including the damages they sustained from the explosion. 
 3 7 Killed by Bomb Blasts in Jerusalem, supra note 1. Among the dead were three girls, age 
twelve, fourteen, and fifteen respectively, along with an unidentified man and the three bombers. Id. 
 4 Campuzano, 281 F. Supp. 2d at 260–61; Lawrence Hurley, U.S. Top Court Takes Up Fight 
Over Ancient Persian Artifacts, REUTERS, (June 27, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-
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material support from the Iranian government to carry out these attacks, quick-
ly took responsibility for the bombings.5 The United States District Court for 
the District of Columbia held that the Islamic Republic of Iran was a state 
sponsor of terror and was therefore responsible for the damages that the vic-
tims sustained as a result of the attack.6 Soon after the ruling, the victims be-
gan fighting for compensation for the damages they sustained.7 
The U.S. legal system has struggled to provide American victims of terror 
attacks with an effective vehicle to recover financial compensation for their 
                                                                                                                           
court-iran/u-s-top-court-takes-up-fight-over-ancient-persian-artifacts-idUSKBN19I1R8 [https://perma.
cc/GD9U-QQ3F]. 
 5 Campuzano, 281 F. Supp. 2d at 270; Schmemann, supra note 2. Foreign sovereigns provide 
“material support” to a terror organization by supplying funding, training, tactical advice, weapons, 
and logistical guidance. Allan v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 17-338, 2019 WL 1330829, at *4 
(D.D.C. Mar. 25, 2019). In a statement, Hamas demanded the release of all Arab prisoners held by 
Israel, specifically Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, the spiritual leader of Hamas. Schmemann, supra note 2. 
The bombings on July 30 and September 4 were widely believed to be related. Id. The shrapnel used 
in each—mainly nails, nuts and bolts—came from the “same package” of materials. Id. Both attacks 
also preceded a high-profile diplomatic visit from a U.S. government official, Middle East mediator 
Dennis Ross in July and Secretary of State Madeline Albright in September. Id. Shortly after the at-
tacks, Muaid Said Bilal and Omar Abdel Rahman al-Zaban were arrested for, and convicted of, multi-
ple counts of murder, attempted murder, and being active members of the Hamas terror organization. 
Campuzano, 281 F. Supp. 2d at 261. Both men gave detailed accounts of the September 4 bombings, 
including how they were planned and financed. Id. at 261–62. During an initial trial in 2003 that in-
volved many of the same defendants and plaintiffs participating in the instant action, a Washington, 
D.C. district court found that the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran provided material sup-
port to Hamas. Compare id. at 258, 270 (involving victims and perpetrators of the Ben Yehuda bomb-
ing), with Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran (Rubin III), 830 F.3d 470, 473 (7th Cir. 2016) (involving 
the same plaintiffs and defendants), aff'd, 138 S. Ct. 816 (2018). 
 6 Campuzano, 281 F. Supp. 2d at 262. The court held that Iran had a specific branch of its gov-
ernment, called the Ministry of Information and Security (MOIS) with a budget between 
$100,000,000 – $400,000,000 at the time. Id. Trial transcripts revealed that the MOIS spent between 
$50,000,000 – $100,000,000 each year sponsoring various terrorist activities across numerous organi-
zations. Id. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard is the military wing of the MOIS and trained many Ha-
mas operatives who would go on to execute terrorist attacks in the Middle East. Id. This kind of mate-
rial, extensive, and continuous support was a direct result of official Iranian state policy and was sanc-
tioned by high-ranking government officials, such as Ayatollah Khomeini. Id. Regarding the Septem-
ber 4, 1997 attack on Ben Yehuda street, testimony at the trial conclusively showed that the bombing 
could not have happened without Iranian support. Id. at 261–62. Furthermore, the U.S. Department of 
State has listed Iran as a state sponsor of terrorism since 1984. Id. at 262. Because Iran provided direct 
military and material support and because this support was approved by the highest levels of the Irani-
an government, the court decided that Iran was a state sponsor of terrorism. Id. at 269. This designa-
tion paved the way for the plaintiffs in the instant case to continue to fight the government of Iran for 
compensation for the damages they sustained as a result of the Ben Yehuda bombing. Rubin III, 830 
F.3d at 473. 
 7 Id. at 474–75 (detailing the lengthy legal journey taken by the plaintiffs in search of compensa-
tion, including initially winning a default judgment in 2003 and numerous procedural challenges that 
went up and down the court hierarchy); see infra note 84 (providing a description of the damages 
suffered by the plaintiffs). 
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injuries.8 Many of the injuries that the plaintiffs sustained, like those in the Ben 
Yehuda bombings, can be traced back to foreign governments that support ter-
rorists responsible for these attacks.9 Unsurprisingly, it is difficult to compel 
such foreign bodies to pay for the consequences of their actions.10 Courts have 
provided judgments in favor of plaintiffs for millions of dollars only to have 
the plaintiffs languish for decades because there is no clear legal path to recov-
ery.11 
All three branches of the U.S. government have struggled to create a way 
for these victims to receive compensation for their injuries.12 The legislative 
                                                                                                                           
 8 See Rubin III, 830 F.3d at 473 (describing difficulties faced by the plaintiffs in attempting to 
execute their judgment). 
 9 See Campuzano, 281 F. Supp. 2d at 270 (holding that Iran provided material support to Hamas 
for the Ben Yehuda bombings); see, e.g., Stansell v. Republic of Cuba, 217 F. Supp. 3d 320, 329, 345 
(D.D.C. 2016) (finding that the government of Cuba provided material support to the Fuerzas Arma-
das Revolucionarias de Colombia—a known terrorist organization—when the organization killed one 
American and held three others captive after an American embassy plane crash in Colombia in Febru-
ary 2003); Thuneibat v. Syrian Arab Republic, 167 F. Supp. 3d 22, 30–31, 34, 36 (D.D.C. 2016) 
(holding that the Syrian government provided material support to Al-Qaeda, a known terrorist group 
led by Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, in a November 2005 suicide bombing that killed two Americans in 
Amman, Jordan); Owens v. Republic of Sudan, 826 F. Supp. 2d 128, 150 (D.D.C. 2011) (holding that 
the governments of both Iran and Sudan provided material support to terrorists, specifically for the Al-
Qaeda bombings of the U.S. embassies in Lebanon, Kenya, and Tanzania in the 1980s and 1990s). 
 10 See Rubin III, 830 F.3d at 474 (holding that plaintiffs were unable to recover damages from 
Iran because the property in question did not fit within an exception to foreign immunity). This is not 
the first or only case where victims of terror have been denied in their quest to receive compensation 
from a foreign government. See, e.g., Ungar v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 211 F. Supp. 2d 91, 98–99 
(D.D.C. 2002) (providing another example of such a denial). In 2002, a district court in Washington, 
D.C. found that the plaintiffs did not establish a sufficient connection between the government of Iran 
and the individuals who murdered Yaron and Efrat Unger in Israel. Id. at 99. The court found that 
because Iran did not provide support for the specific attack at issue, the estate of Mr. and Mrs. Ungar 
could not sue the government of Iran to pay for damages sustained in the murders. Id. at 93, 99–100. 
Even when a U.S. court finds that a country is a state sponsor of terror and provides a judgment in 
favor of American plaintiffs—like in Rubin—it is difficult to make the offending country pay its 
debts. See, e.g., Joseph A. Slobodzian, Justice Arrives—34 Years After Beirut Embassy Bombing, 
INQUIRER (Phila.), (Apr. 17, 2017), http://www.philly.com/philly/news/crime/Justice-arrives-34-
years-after-Beirut-embassy-bombing.html [https://perma.cc/Q68D-WVXM] (providing an example of 
Iran refusing to compensate victims of Iranian-sponsored terrorist attacks). 
 11 See, e.g., Slobodzian, supra note 10 (reporting that victims of the U.S. embassy bombing in 
Beirut, Lebanon waited over thirty years to receive compensation for their injuries, despite receiving a 
judgment from a U.S. court). 
 12 See, e.g., Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran (Rubin IV), 138 S. Ct. 816, 821 (2018) (granting 
partial writ of certiori to settle a circuit split regarding key provisions of the Foreign Sovereign Im-
munities Act (FSIA)); see Edith Bradley, My Brother and Father Were Killed by Terrorists. Trump’s 
Sudan Deal Just Betrayed Us, POLITICO (Oct. 17, 2017) https://www.politico.com/agenda/story/
2017/10/12/trump-sudan-deal-betrays-terrorism-victims-000548 [https://perma.cc/H3EV-XK86] (de-
scribing how the Trump Administration failed to use leverage against the Sudanese government to 
compel it to pay for damages suffered by American victims of Sudanese-sponsored terrorist attacks); 
Natalie Rodriguez, Justice Delayed, LAW360, 1–2 (Mar. 11 2016), https://www.crowell.com/files/
20160311-Justice-Delayed-Terrorism-Victims-Fight-For-Redress-Newberger.pdf [https://perma.cc/
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branch has attempted to resolve this problem with legislation like the Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”) and subsequent amendments to it, includ-
ing the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (“JASTA”).13 Although the 
FSIA was intended to provide an immunity guarantee to foreign governments, 
Congress added exceptions for situations involving state sponsored terrorist 
attacks to help compensate victims.14 JASTA attempted to broaden and clarify 
the exception by stating that if a country is found to have generally sponsored 
terrorist organizations aggressive to the United States, the country directed 
(and is legally responsible for) the organization’s specific actions against the 
United States when an attack occurs on U.S. soil.15 The ambiguous language of 
the FSIA and its subsequent amendments, however, have undermined Con-
gress’s attempts to create a fair and navigable process for all U.S. victims of 
terror and their families to follow.16 
Similarly, the executive branch has had limited success using diplomatic 
negotiation to obtain compensation for families and has been reluctant to take 
harder stances for fear of retaliation from other countries.17 Congress has also 
                                                                                                                           
S22B-WE32] (documenting the difficulties and setbacks faced by victims of terror in their attempts to 
receive compensation). 
 13 See Haley Claxton, Comment, Indiana Jones and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 
(FSIA): Interpreting FSIA’s State Sponsored Terror Exception, 66 U. KAN. L. REV. 181, 183–84 
(2017) (describing amendments to FSIA). 
 14 H.R. REP. NO. 110-477, at 1001 (2007) (Conf. Rep.); Claxton, supra note 13 at 188–89; see 
infra note 65 (describing the full legislative history of the FSIA). 
 15 Press Release, Office of Congressman Jerrold Nadler, Reps. Lungren and Nadler Introduce Bill 
to Hold Foreign Sponsors of Terrorism Accountable (June 8, 2012), https://nadler.house.gov/press-
release/reps-lungren-and-nadler-introduce-bill-hold-foreign-sponsors-terrorism-accountable [https://
perma.cc/T9VN-5XHE] [hereinafter Nadler]; Ingrid Wuerth, Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism 
Act: Initial Analysis, LAW FARE BLOG (Sept. 29, 2016) https://www.lawfareblog.com/justice-against-
sponsors-terrorism-act-initial-analysis [https://perma.cc/WAA6-HM4M]. For example, government 
officials in Saudi Arabia have close connections with organizations linked to terrorist groups. Nadler, 
supra. Even lacking direct proof linking the Saudi government to specific attacks on Americans, like 
the 9/11 attacks, these general connections would be enough to allow U.S. citizens to sue the Saudi 
government for material support of a terror attack. Id. 
 16 See 28 U.S.C. § 1610 (2012) (detailing two different exceptions to foreign sovereign immunity 
without explicit language explaining how they relate to one another); Rubin III, 830 F.3d at 487 (con-
tradicting prior precedent and another circuit court’s decision about the same statutory language). 
 17 See David A. Graham, Why Obama Vetoed the 9/11 Lawsuit Bill, THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 26, 
2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/09/obama-veto-911-saudi-arabia/501491/ 
[https://perma.cc/HWF9-2XBD] (explaining that President Obama vetoed a bill that would have al-
lowed American victims of the 9/11 attacks to sue the Saudi Arabian government because it would 
have put American officials abroad at risk); Kirit Radhia & Maddy Sauer, Pan Am 103 Families Fi-
nally Compensated, ABC NEWS (Oct. 31, 2008, 4:51 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/story?id=
6158491 [https://perma.cc/TP8Z-7PF8] (reporting on the American government negotiating compen-
sation for the victims of the Lockerbie plane bombing with the Libyan government in exchange for the 
return of normalized diplomatic relations). President Obama vetoed the Justice Against Sponsors of 
Terrorism Act (“JASTA”), but it was overridden by Congress. Karoun Demirjian & David Nakamura, 
White House Accuses Congress of ‘Buyer’s Remorse’ on 9/11 Bill, WASH. POST (Sept. 29, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2016/09/29/republican-leaders-say-911-
2019] Victims of State Sponsored Terrorism  1457 
set up common funds for victims with mixed results.18 Finally, the courts have 
been charged with determining how to hold foreign governments liable, which 
has resulted in confusing and contradictory results, as seen in the circuit split 
between the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth and Ninth Circuits.19 
By bringing their case to the United States Supreme Court, the victims of 
the Ben Yehuda bombings provided the Court with an opportunity to create an 
effective recovery mechanism for U.S. victims of state sponsored terrorism by 
clarifying confusing and ambiguous legislation.20 Such a result would have 
obviated the need for executive branch officers to negotiate with adversarial 
countries.21 It also would have lessened the challenges the legislative branch 
                                                                                                                           
measure-may-need-to-be-revisited-after-elections/?utm_term=.2952ff5717de [https://perma.cc/S8Y6-
VYM6]. The President vetoed the bill because of two main concerns. Graham, supra note 17. First, 
the administration was concerned that legislation making it easier for citizens to sue foreign govern-
ments would take control of how the U.S. treats countries that support terrorist attacks away from 
national security experts and give it to lesser informed individuals and courts. Id. Second, JASTA had 
the potential to have major consequences for the international reciprocity of sovereign immunity. Id. If 
foreign sovereign immunity is threatened in the United States, there is not much stopping other coun-
tries from coming up with their own rules and treating Americans living abroad however they see fit. 
See Demirjian & Nakamura, supra. (reporting on lawmakers’ concerns that U.S. diplomats and ser-
vice members could face litigation abroad). Ironically, this concern was articulated by congressional 
leaders just days after Congress overrode President Obama’s veto. Id. Republican congressional lead-
ers expressed this concern and blamed the Obama White House for failing to bring this danger to their 
attention, but only after both the Senate and House overrode the President’s veto. Id. 
 18 See, e.g., Rodriguez, supra note 12, at 6 (describing the dissatisfaction some individuals felt 
about the 9/11 victims fund claims process). These kinds of funds have pitted victim against victim in 
their efforts to claim as much compensation as possible from a limited supply of funds. See id. at 5–6 
(providing an example of one of these funds and the consequences of how it was structured). This in-
fighting occurred when Congress tried to compensate victims of 9/11 attacks but also happened when 
the United States normalized relations with Libya and negotiated compensation for the victims of 
UTA Flight 772—otherwise known as Lockerbie II—a plane that went down in the Niger desert due 
to a suitcase bomb. Id.; Kimberly Kindy, Families of Americans Killed in 1989 Bombing See Victory 
Over Libya Nullified, WASH. POST (Dec. 23, 2008), http://www.cicte.oas.org/rev/en/about/News/
2008/CICTE%20News2_2008_4.pdf [https://perma.cc/4MGU-KUGF]. 
 19 Compare Rubin III, 830 F.3d at 487 (holding acts of state sponsored terror do not expose all 
foreign owned property located in America to attachment and that foreign-held property is used for 
“commercial use” only if the foreign actor is the party commercially using the property in question), 
with Bennett v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 825 F.3d 949, 965 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding that any foreign 
owned property located in America is eligible to be attached if the owner is a country that has been 
found to be a state sponsor of terror, regardless of how the property is used), abrogated by Rubin IV, 
138 S. Ct. 816 (2018). 
 20 See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 9, Rubin III, 830 F.3d 470 (No. 16-534) (arguing that 
ruling in favor of the plaintiffs would provide relief from the prolonged, painful, and often futile at-
tempts to exact justice that has plagued victims of terror before § 1610(g) was enacted); see also Ru-
bin III, 830 F.3d at 487 (contradicting prior precedent and another circuit court’s interpretation of the 
same statutory language). 
 21 See Jonathan Broder, Exclusive: U.S. Taxpayers, Not Tehran, Compensated Victims of Iranian 
Attacks Against Americans, NEWSWEEK (Feb. 5, 2018, 4:25 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/iran-
nuclear-deal-terrorism-victims-families-stephen-flatow-barack-obama-418770 [https://perma.cc/BK7B-
AA6J] (explaining that American victims of Iranian-sponsored terror attacks were paid by U.S. tax-
payers rather than the Iranian government, contrary to promises by the Clinton Administration); Gar-
1458 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 60:1453 
faces when it creates limited common funds that pit victim against victim and 
the judicial branch struggles with when it interprets confusing and vague legis-
lation.22 Unfortunately, in February 2018 the United States Supreme Court in 
Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran (Rubin IV) ruled against the victims in a 
unanimous decision that closed off one of the few remaining opportunities to 
recover the damages they are owed.23 
The Rubin plaintiffs asked the Court to clarify the language in the FSIA 
by allowing victims of terror to seek an attachment on foreign-owned property 
in the United States, whether such property is used for commercial activity.24 
The ambiguous statutory language created competing interpretations of appli-
cable property under the state sponsored terrorism exemption, and the Rubin 
plaintiffs believed the Court should have resolved the ambiguity in a way that 
produced equitable results for victims.25 Rather than limiting attachable prop-
erty to property used for commercial activity, the Court should have ruled in 
favor of the plaintiffs in Rubin IV and expanded the scope of property eligible 
for attachment because of the legislative intent behind disputed portions of the 
FSIA, because of the statute’s plain language, and to ensure adequate recourse 
to the victims of state sponsored terrorism.26 
Part I of this note describes the legislative history of the laws meant to 
compensate victims of terror, provides examples of how terror victims in the 
past have (or have not) been compensated for their injuries, details the circuit 
split at issue in Rubin IV, and explains the United States Supreme Court’s ul-
timate ruling.27 Part II discusses the dilemma facing victims of terror in more 
detail by laying out the legislative, diplomatic, and judicial obstacles between 
plaintiffs and their compensation.28 Finally, Part III argues why the Supreme 
                                                                                                                           
diner Harris, Trump Administration Formally Lifts Sanctions Against Sudan, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 6, 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/06/us/politics/trump-sanctions-sudan.html [https://perma.
cc/9MU2-E85N] (describing a diplomatic agreement between the United States and Sudan which 
lifted economic sanctions without securing assurances that the Sudanese government would pay for 
damages to U.S. victims from Sudanese-sponsored terror attacks). 
 22 See Gates v. Syrian Arab Republic, 755 F.3d 568, 575 (7th Cir. 2014) (detailing two groups of 
U.S. victims of Syrian-sponsored terror attacks suing each other for first access to funds designated 
for terror-related judgments), overruled by Rubin III, 830 F.3d 470 (7th Cir. 2016), aff’d, 138 S. Ct. 
816 (2018); Rodriguez, supra note 12, at 1–10 (describing dissatisfaction among U.S. victims of terror 
who are often forced to compete for the same finite pool of money). 
 23 Rubin IV, 138 S. Ct. at 816, 820. 
 24 See Petitioner’s Brief at 4, Rubin IV, 138 S. Ct. 816, (No. 16-534), 2017 WL 3913770, at *4. 
(arguing 28 U.S.C. § 1610(g) applied to all property owned by a foreign state sponsor of terrorism or 
one of the state’s agents or instrumentalities). 
 25 Id. 
 26 Id. at 24–61. 
 27 See infra notes 30–113 and accompanying text. 
 28 See infra notes 114–175 and accompanying text. 
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Court should have ruled in favor of the Rubin plaintiffs and discusses the rul-
ing’s potential effect on future cases and ancillary parties.29 
I. LEGAL AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF COMPENSATION FOR  
VICTIMS OF TERROR AND THEIR FAMILIES 
Though the U.S. government has attempted to provide a path for Ameri-
can victims of terror attacks to receive compensation for their injuries, and has 
widespread support to do so, actually creating a workable solution has proven 
to be nearly impossible.30 Subsection A begins with an overview of foreign 
sovereign immunity.31 Subsection B describes the Foreign Sovereign Immunity 
Act (FSIA).32 Subsection C outlines the most recent amendment to the FSIA, 
the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (JASTA).33 Subsection D pro-
vides examples of how past victims of terror attacks have received compensa-
tion.34 Subsection E provides the factual and legal background of Rubin v. Is-
lamic Republic of Iran (Rubin IV) and explains the circuit split between Rubin 
v. Islamic Republic of Iran (Rubin III) and Bennett v. Islamic Republic of Iran 
that spurred the Supreme Court to grant certiorari for this case.35 Finally, Sub-
section F discusses the Court’s ruling in Rubin IV.36 
A. Explanation of the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Doctrine 
Foreign sovereign immunity protects foreign governments from being 
sued in U.S. courts.37 The United States followed an “absolute theory” of for-
eign sovereign immunity from the late nineteenth century to the middle of the 
twentieth century.38 The “absolute theory” provided international countries 
                                                                                                                           
 29 See infra notes 176–219 and accompanying text. 
 30 See Ilana Arnowitz Drescher, Seeking Justice for America’s Forgotten Victims: Reforming the 
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act Terrorism Exception, 15 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL. 791, 796–
806 (2012) (arguing current laws do not effectively compensate victims and detailing the legislative 
history of attempts to do so); Seung Min Kim, Congress Hands Obama First Veto Override, POLITICO 
(Sept. 26, 2016, 12:32 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2016/09/senate-jasta-228841 [https://
perma.cc/6XYV-H4N5] (describing how the most recent legislation attempting to provide compensa-
tion enjoyed broad support in both houses of Congress). 
 31 See infra notes 37–47 and accompanying text. 
 32 See infra notes 48–64 and accompanying text. 
 33 See infra notes 65–69 and accompanying text. 
 34 See infra notes 70–83 and accompanying text. 
 35 See infra notes 84–102 and accompanying text. 
 36 See infra notes 103–113 and accompanying text. 
 37 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (2012); Dan Cahill, The Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act: An In-
fringement on Executive Power, 58 B.C. L. REV. 1699, 1710 (2017). 
 38 Ethan J. Early, Note, Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities 
Act: Is Peace of Mind Enough?, 14 CONN. J. INT’L L. 203, 205 (1999); Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, 
Note, A Critique of the Terrorism Exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 34 N.Y.U. J. 
INT’L L. & POL. 887, 889 (2002). Foreign sovereign immunity has been recognized by the Supreme 
1460 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 60:1453 
with broad immunity from the U.S. judicial system, subject to a few excep-
tions.39 Foreign sovereign immunity was a “matter of grace and comity on the 
part of the United States” and was largely left to the Executive Branch.40 Even 
if a U.S. court granted itself jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign, and the 
plaintiff received a judgment on their claim, the United States used to provide 
absolute immunity over any execution of a judgment, thereby making the 
judgment itself effectively meaningless.41 This commitment to foreign sover-
eign immunity helped to keep foreign relations in status quo because keeping 
foreign assets safe domestically ensured protection for U.S. assets abroad.42 
At the urging of the State Department, this policy changed in 1952, when 
the government granted “restrictive” immunity to foreign states by providing 
jurisdictional immunity for actions from a state’s “public acts” but not for 
“strictly commercial” actions.43 With the new flexibility, foreign states could 
be sued and compelled to pay judgments if their offending actions could be 
categorized as “commercial.”44 This theory narrowed the scope of sovereign 
immunity and allowed plaintiffs to receive a judgment against a foreign gov-
                                                                                                                           
Court for many years. See, e.g., Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 134 (1812) 
(providing an early example of the “absolute theory”). Early cases of absolute immunity largely cen-
tered around foreign diplomats and foreign public ships. S. Jason Baletsa, Comment, The Cost of 
Closure: A Reexamination of the Theory and Practice of the 1996 Amendments to the Foreign Sover-
eign Immunities Act, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1247, 1251–52 (2000). In Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 
the French navy captured a ship owned by two Americans who sued to regain custody after the ship 
docked in a U.S. naval yard. 11 U.S. at 117. Chief Justice John Marshall explained the rationale for 
sovereign immunity when he observed that the world was full of equally free and independent coun-
tries and imputed the immunity enjoyed by a nation as a whole onto the individual foreign sovereign 
who enters a different country with different laws. Id. at 137. Without this guarantee, it would be 
difficult for anyone to go anywhere with any assurance of fair treatment. See id. (holding that individ-
uals are only bound by the laws of their home, rather than by the laws of the new country because one 
country’s laws cannot compel a different country to act differently). Because of the foreign sovereign 
immunity’s importance, Chief Justice Marshall found that the French navy was immune from jurisdic-
tion, and he dismissed the case. Id. at 147. 
 39 See Drescher, supra note 30, at 798 (citing JOSEPH M. SWEENEY, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, THE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 20–21 (1963) (stating that the U.S. government did 
not grant absolute immunity to foreign sovereigns when the litigation involved foreign-owned im-
movable property or an estate that was administered locally)). 
 40 Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran (Rubin III), 830 F.3d 470, 476 (7th Cir. 2016) (citing Verlin-
den B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983)), aff’d, 138 S. Ct. 816 (2018). For this 
reason, the judiciary followed the guidance of the executive to determine when American courts had 
jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns and their agents. Id. The plaintiff would only receive the judgment 
if the foreign sovereign voluntarily paid the debt. Id. at 477. 
 41 See Rubin III, 830 F.3d at 476 (citing Autotech Techs. LP v. Integral Research & Dev. Corp., 
499 F.3d 737, 749 (7th Cir. 2007) (arguing that the victims depend on voluntary payments by the 
foreign governments)). 
 42 See Drescher, supra note 30, at 798 (citing Chief Justice Marshall, who justified sovereign 
immunity’s importance by emphasizing each government’s equality and independence). 
 43 Rubin III, 830 F.3d at 477. 
 44 See id. (detailing the differences between the absolute theory of immunity and the restrictive 
theory solidified through the FSIA). 
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ernment, but it did not go so far as to compel foreign defendants to forfeit 
property in many instances.45 Furthermore, the U.S. government occasionally 
circumvented the rules and decided that certain foreign sovereign defendants 
should receive immunity when that party would not have otherwise been eligi-
ble for such a privilege.46 Congress officially codified restrictive sovereign 
immunity with the passage of the FSIA in 1976.47 
B. Explanation of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 
The FSIA provides a wide spectrum of legal guidelines for all civil ac-
tions against foreign entities.48 The legislation’s purpose is to uphold the for-
eign sovereign immunity doctrine by broadly shielding foreign governments 
and other bodies from being sued in U.S. courts.49 The legislation includes a 
section on jurisdictional immunity, providing guidelines for when U.S. courts 
can hear a case regarding foreign sovereign immunity.50 There is also a section 
on execution immunity, which instructs U.S. courts on whether they can com-
pel a foreign sovereign to pay damages owed to a plaintiff.51 The language in 
28 U.S.C. § 1605A is especially relevant for the purposes of compensating vic-
tims of terror because it creates a specific immunity exception for foreign 
states found liable for sponsoring terrorist attacks.52 In other words, this sec-
                                                                                                                           
 45 See id. (describing foreign sovereign immunity and exceptions under the FSIA). 
 46 Id. (citing Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd., 573 U.S. 134, 141 (2014)). This confu-
sion largely stemmed from a letter written in 1952 by Jack Tate, the U.S. Department of State’s legal 
counsel, to the Attorney General. Drescher, supra note 30, at 798, (citing Letter from Jack B. Tate, 
Acting Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Philip B. Perlman, Acting Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice (May 19, 1952), in 26 DEP’T ST. BULL. 984 (1952) [hereinafter Tate Letter]. Though the letter 
recommended the distinction between public and private acts, it did not provide guidance on distin-
guishing between these different kinds of acts. Drescher, supra note 30, at 798. Instead, the State 
Department implemented a case by case review method that did not provide consistent results. Id. at 
799. 
 47 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (2012); Rubin III, 830 F.3d at 477. 
 48 Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 488; see 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (detailing when foreign sovereign-owned 
property is eligible for attachment in a variety of circumstances). According to the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Verlinden, the statute governs all immunity claims against foreign states in all civil con-
texts. 461 U.S. at 488. 
 49 28 U.S.C. § 1602. Congress intended for the FSIA to justly protect both the rights of both for-
eign actors and domestic litigants. Id. 
 50 § 1604. 
 51 § 1609. 
 52 See § 1605A (discussing when foreign countries are liable for damages sustained by victims of 
terrorist attacks). According to the statute, the Rubin plaintiffs must prove the following four elements 
to establish grounds for liability: (1) “the foreign country was designated a state sponsor of terrorism 
at the time [of] the act”; (2) the victim was a U.S. national; (3) the claimant afforded the foreign state 
a reasonable opportunity to arbitrate the claim; and (4) the victim sought monetary damages “for per-
sonal injury or death that was caused by an act of torture, extrajudicial killing . . . or the provision of 
material support or resources for such an act, if such an act . . . is engaged in by an official, employee, 
or agent . . .” of a foreign country. § 1605A(a)(1)–(c); see Rubin III, 830 F.3d at 478 (describing that 
the plaintiffs are suing under section 1605A). 
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tion strips jurisdictional immunity from a foreign state if it is found to be a 
“state sponsor of terrorism” of the act in question.53 
There are, however, still restrictions on how foreign states are compelled 
to pay judgments even if they are found to be a state sponsor of terrorism.54 
Section 1609 states that property of a foreign sovereign is not eligible for at-
tachment unless it also fits into one of the exceptions found in §§ 1610 and 
1611 of the act.55 Some courts, such as the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Seventh Circuit, have interpreted these sections as allowing attachment of 
foreign-owned property only if it meets one of the exceptions in § 1610 (a) or 
(b), even if it also meets a different exception within the statute.56 
Specific exceptions to the immunity of foreign sovereign-owned property 
from attachment or execution are contained in 28 U.S.C. § 1610.57 The most 
                                                                                                                           
 53 § 1605A(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). The FSIA was created by Congress to clean up the mess left behind by 
the Tate Letter and today provides the “sole basis” for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign entity in 
U.S. courts. See Joshua Dermott et al., The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA): 2008 Year in 
Review, CROWELL & MORING (2008), https://www.crowell.com/documents/Foreign-Sovereign-
Immunities-Act-FSIA_08-Review.pdf [https://perma.cc/RX66-47XN] (discussing how the FSIA was 
meant to clarify the ambiguity in the Tate Letter); Tate Letter, supra note 46. Prior to the FSIA, for-
eign states would present their claims of immunity to the U.S. Department of State’s Office of the 
Legal Advisor in informal and quasi-judicial hearings. Naomi Roht-Arriaza, The Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act and Human Rights Violations: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back?, 16 BERKELEY J. 
INT’L L. 71, 72 (1998). To make matters worse, courts had different views of whether the results of 
these ad hoc hearings were legally binding. Id. The hope was to create a system that was more black 
and white and decided by the judiciary rather than through unpredictable and uncertain hearings in-
volving external diplomatic pressures on the OLA’s decision. Id. at 72–73. President Ford momentari-
ly vetoed the FSIA when it was first brought to his desk because he was presented with two versions 
of the same bill after a miscommunication between the House and the Senate. Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act of 1976, 12 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1554 (Oct. 23, 1976); Veto of the Foreign 
Immunities Bill, 12 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1554 (Oct. 22, 1976). Just a day later, the matter was 
resolved and President Ford signed the bill into law. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, su-
pra. 
 54 § 1609. 
 55 Id. For a complete list of the exceptions surrounding the commercial use of foreign-owned 
property, refer to 28 U.S.C. § 1610. Section 1611 describes carve outs of § 1610. In other words, even 
if the property in question was used for commercial use, and could fit into an exception listed in 
§ 1610, § 1611 details the situations where the property would still be immune from attachment. 
 56 Rubin III, 830 F.3d at 487. Meanwhile, the Ninth Circuit reads the state sponsor exception as 
independent of any other exception in the FSIA. Bennett, 825 F.3d at 959, 965. This will be discussed 
further in coming sections. Compare Rubin III, 830 F.3d at 487 (holding that state sponsor-owned 
property located in the United States is eligible for attachment only if the foreign state is using the 
property for a commercial purpose), with Bennett, 799 F.3d at 965 (holding that any property located 
in the United States owned by a foreign state sponsor of terror is eligible for attachment). 
 57 § 1610. Notably, immunity can only be removed if the property in question was being used for 
a “commercial activity” as defined by the statute. Id. If the property was only for private use, then it 
cannot be touched by an American court, regardless of other exceptions within § 1610 that may apply 
to the foreign state that owns the property. See id. (detailing when foreign state-owned property may 
be immunized from attachment when a claimant tries to execute a judgment from a U.S. court); Rubin 
III, 830 F.3d at 477 (describing commercial activity as an important exception to foreign sovereign 
immunity). Some of the more mundane exceptions in § 1610 include when a foreign state waives its 
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notable exceptions for the purposes of the Rubin plaintiffs fall in § 1610(a), (b) 
and (g), all of which can apply to execution proceedings obtained under the 
terrorism exception of § 1605A.58 Sections 1610(a) and (b) specify that proper-
ty owned by a foreign sovereign, its instrumentality, or its agent that is held in 
the United States may be eligible for attachment or execution in a variety of 
judgments if it is “used for a commercial activity in the United States.”59 
Meanwhile, § 1610(g) states that, when a judgment is specifically entered 
under § 1605A, the property of a foreign state’s instrumentality or agent can be 
attached to help execute the judgment.60 This is a departure from prior court 
decisions, which used five factors outlined by the Supreme Court in the 1983 
decision First National City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cu-
ba (“Bancec”) to determine if property could be attached to pay for damages 
sustained from a state sponsored terrorism attack.61 These factors made it diffi-
cult for plaintiffs to recover damages from these attacks because the parame-
ters outlining eligible property were narrow.62 The passage of § 1610(g) 
changed this calculus because it specifically repealed all five of the Bancec 
factors in subsections (A)–(E).63 This, however, does not mean plaintiffs are 
                                                                                                                           
privilege to immunity and when the property in question was used for the commercial activity that the 
claim is based upon. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)–(f). 
 58 § 1610 (a)–(b), (g); see Rubin III, 830 F.3d at 477 (describing subsections (a) and (b) as “prom-
inent”). In other words, § 1610(g) details how a victim of terror can obtain compensation once a de-
fendant foreign state is found to be a state sponsor of terrorism and therefore does not have the im-
munity regularly conferred onto a foreign state. 
 59 § 1610(a)–(b). 
 60 § 1610(g). 
 61 Rubin III, 830 F.3d at 481. The five rules were as follows: how much economic control the 
foreign state had over the property; whether the profits of the property went to the foreign state; how 
much control foreign state officials had over the daily affairs of the property; whether the foreign state 
was the only beneficiary of the property in question; and whether establishing the property as a sepa-
rate entity would have given the foreign state benefits in the U.S. court system while avoiding future 
obligations. Id. at 483. These rules were a response to the Supreme Court’s 1983 decision in First 
National City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba, which created the Bancec rule. 462 
U.S. 611, 626–27 (1983); Rubin III, 830 F.3d at 481. The Bancec decision generally prohibited the 
execution of a judgment against a foreign government, except for two limited exceptions: (1) the for-
eign government and the instrumentality in question were alter egos; or (2) adhering to the general 
rule of separateness would create a fraud or injustice. 462 U.S at 628–33. 
 62 See Rubin IV, 138 S. Ct. at 823 (finding that § 1610(g) did away with the Bancec factors, 
thereby making more property available to plaintiffs). 
 63 Rubin III, 830 F.3d at 483. Subsections (A)–(E) effectively repeal the Bancec factors because 
property can be attached “regardless of” the five subsections that almost perfectly mirror the five 
Bancec factors. Id. The text of the statute is as follows: 
[T]he property of a foreign state against which a judgment is entered under section 
1605A . . . is subject to attachment . . . regardless of—  
(A) the level of economic control over the property by the government of the foreign 
state; 
(B) whether the profits of the property go to that government; 
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merely required to prove that the attack in question was state sponsored to exe-
cute their judgment.64 
C. Explanation of the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act 
The FSIA has gone through numerous revisions throughout the years, 
most recently in September 2016 when Congress overrode a Presidential veto 
and passed JASTA.65 Before the amendment, U.S. courts determined the state 
sponsor of terrorism exemption applied to victims of terror attacks in the Unit-
ed States when the state sponsor outfitted the specific attack that injured U.S. 
citizens.66 JASTA widens the terrorism exception and allows for victims to sue 
foreign governments for generally funding terrorist organizations that affect 
U.S. citizens on U.S. soil, regardless of whether or not the foreign sovereign 
funded the specific attack.67 According to Senators John Cornyn (R-TX) and 
                                                                                                                           
(C) the degree to which officials of that government manage the property or otherwise 
control its daily affairs; 
(D) whether that government is the sole beneficiary in interest of the property; or 
(E) whether establishing the property as a separate entity would entitle the foreign state 
to benefits in United States courts while avoiding its obligations.  
§ 1610(g)(1)(A)–(E) (emphasis added). 
 64 See Rubin IV, 138 S. Ct. at 820 (holding § 1610(g) is not an independent exemption of foreign 
sovereign immunity). 
 65 Kim, supra note 30. Section 2(b) of JASTA explicitly states Congress’s intent in passing the 
legislation was to provide litigants with the “broadest possible basis” to get relief against foreign 
states that directly or indirectly have provided material support to terrorist organizations acting against 
the United States. Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act, Pub. L. No. 114-222, § 2(b), 130 Stat. 
852, 853 (2016). 
 66 Congress Overrides Obama’s Veto to Pass Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act, 111 AM. 
J. INT’L L.156, 156 (2017) (citing In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, 714 F.3d 109, 117 (2d 
Cir. 2013). 
 67 See Wuerth, supra note 15 (explaining how JASTA creates a new avenue to sue foreign gov-
ernments for a terrorist attack in the United States and for a specific action of the foreign government, 
no matter where the foreign state’s tortious actions occurred). The FSIA was first passed in 1976. 
Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran (Rubin I), 637 F.3d 783, 792 (7th Cir. 2011), as corrected (Apr. 1, 
2011). The original foreign sovereign exemption regarding terrorism was introduced in 1996 through 
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, which amended the FSIA by including 
§ 1605(a)(7). Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 221(a), 
110 Stat. 1214, 1241 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) (1996)); Petitioner’s Brief, supra 
note 24, at 10. The relevant language eliminated foreign sovereignty in situations where victims of 
terror attacks sought monetary damages from a foreign state that either executed the act or provided 
material support for it. Rubin I, 637 F.3d at 794 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) (1996)). This exemp-
tion was repealed in 2008 through the National Defense Authorization Act (“NDAA”) and replaced by 
28 U.S.C. § 1605(A). National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-181, 
§ 1083, 122 Stat. 3, 338 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1605(A)); Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 
24, at 10, 15. It restricted the terrorism exception to only acts made by State Department-designated 
“state sponsors of terrorism.” Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 24, at 10. Section 1605(A) was not entire-
ly restrictive, however, as it also allowed plaintiffs to receive punitive damages. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(A); 
Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 24, at 16. The NDAA also contained changes to § 1610(g), which is the 
statute centrally at issue in this case. National Defense Authorization Act § 1083; Petitioner’s Brief, 
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Chuck Schumer (D-NY), the bill attempted to provide a clear path forward for 
victims of terror attacks and their families to receive compensation by opening 
access to previously excluded foreign sovereign properties.68 This helped alle-
viate obstacles facing plaintiffs but did not address the circuit split at issue in 
Rubin IV because the injuries they sustained happened in attacks that occurred 
outside of the United States.69 
D. Previous Methods of Providing Compensation to  
Victims of Terror Attacks 
The plaintiffs in Rubin IV are not the first group of victims who have 
struggled to get relief for their injuries, though certain victims have been more 
successful than others.70 Section D details the most common strategies that 
have been used to receive compensation.71 
                                                                                                                           
supra note 24 at 16. Congress also passed the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act in 2002 which allowed 
victims of terror to execute judgments against any seized or frozen assets of terrorist parties. Terror-
ism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-297, § 201(d)(2)(A), 116 Stat. 2337 (2002); Peti-
tioner’s Brief, supra note 24, at 14. 
 68 See Kim, supra note 30 (discussing how the legislation allowed victims of the 9/11 attacks to 
sue the Saudi Arabian government). Those who spoke in favor of the bill, including Senators Cornyn 
and Schumer, referenced the families of 9/11 victims specifically. Id. JASTA applies, however, to all 
victims of terror attacks, not just casualties of 9/11. Id. The actual impact of JASTA might not be as 
large as its supporters hoped. Wuerth, supra note 15. According to Professor Ingrid Wuerth, the lim-
ited ways in which a victim of terror can execute a judgment against a state sponsor of terror may not 
apply to plaintiffs seeking to utilize the new rules outlined in JASTA. Id. The new legislation allows 
plaintiffs to sue other countries for a wider variety of actions, but it fails to detail how plaintiffs should 
go about executing judgments. Id. This leaves new plaintiffs with the same problem facing the Rubin 
plaintiffs. See 830 F.3d at 487 (finding a lack of eligible property to attach). 
 69 See Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act § 2(b) (failing to address whether state sponsor-
ship of terrorism is a standalone exception to foreign sovereign immunity when American victims 
attempt to recover damages from terrorist attacks); Rubin IV, 138 S. Ct. at 820, 821, n.3 (discussing 
the plaintiffs’ injuries suffered in Israel and when courts strip foreign sovereign immunity); Wuerth, 
supra note 15 (describing how JASTA provides gives terror victims more opportunities to sue foreign 
governments). 
 70 See Rubin IV, 138 S. Ct. at 821 (discussing prior attempts by victims of terrorist attacks to 
receive compensation for their injuries); Dan Levine, In Anti-Terrorism Lawsuits, Verdicts Are Just 
the First Battle, REUTERS, (Apr. 29, 2015), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-attacks-litigation-
victims-insight/in-anti-terrorism-lawsuits-verdicts-are-just-the-first-battle-idUSKBN0NK0A7201
50429 [https://perma.cc/KWF5-LXUZ] (describing difficulties faced by victims of terror after receiv-
ing an initial judgment); Libya Pays $1.5 Billion to Settle Terrorism Claims, CNN (Nov. 21, 2008), 
https://web.archive.org/web/20180916045116/http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/africa/10/31/
libya.payment/index.html [https://perma.cc/9JT8-C2WX] [hereinafter Libya Pays $1.5 Billion] (high-
lighting victims of the Lockerbie bombing receiving compensation decades after the initial attack); 
Joseph A. Slobodzian, supra note 10 (reporting on the struggles victims of various terror attacks expe-
rienced when attempting to receive compensation). 
 71 See Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114–113, § 404, 129 Stat. 2242, 
3007–18 (providing compensation to victims through legislation that created a special fund after 
courts awarded judgments); Libya Pays $1.5 Billion, supra note 70. (reporting on victims who re-
ceived compensation through a diplomatic settlement). 
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1. Diplomatic Settlements 
On December 21, 1988, Pan American flight 103 exploded over the small 
town of Lockerbie, Scotland after terrorists associated with the Libyan gov-
ernment detonated a bomb on board.72 The families of the 189 U.S. victims 
filed suit seeking financial compensation for the loss of their family mem-
bers.73 Rather than going through the court system, however, the victims’ fami-
lies ended up receiving money through a diplomatic agreement between the 
U.S. and Libyan governments.74 The settlement provided the families with five 
hundred million dollars, which was part of a larger one and a half billion dollar 
settlement paid by the Libyan government as compensation for various terror-
ist attacks perpetrated with Libya’s assistance.75 
2. Court Rulings and Legislative Changes 
Over the decades, many U.S. victims of terror attacks and their families 
have received settlements against foreign states, including Iran.76 For example, 
one family of a victim of the 1986 Beirut embassy bombing received a judg-
ment against Iran for thirty million dollars in 2003 after suing under the 
FSIA.77 Despite the court’s decision, there was no real way to collect the mon-
ey.78 Iran did not have enough eligible assets in the U.S. that could be seized to 
help satisfy the judgment.79 To help address this issue, Congress passed an 
omnibus spending bill called the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016.80 The 
                                                                                                                           
 72 Terrorist Bombing of Pan Am Flight 103, C.I.A. (July 23, 2012, 9:08 AM), https://www.cia.
gov/about-cia/cia-museum/experience-the-collection/text-version/stories/terrorist-bombing-of-pan-
am-flight-103.html [http://perma.cc/K32Z-M933]. Two hundred and seventy people died in the attack, 
including all 259 passengers and crew on board the flight and eleven pedestrians on the ground in 
Scotland. Pan Am 103 Bombing: A Look Back, CBS NEWS (last visited Jan. 29, 2018), https://www.
cbsnews.com/pictures/pan-am-103-bombing-a-look-back/ [https://perma.cc/V6KX-YXSN]. 
 73 Libya Pays $1.5 Billion, supra note 70. The agreement also compensated families of victims 
who died in the bombing of La Belle disco in Berlin, Germany in 1986. Id. In addition, the U.S. gov-
ernment paid Libyans $300 million in compensation for a 1988 American airstrike that killed dozens 
of civilians. Id. The settlement also had a larger diplomatic purpose, as the Americans relieved Libya 
of any further legal liability surrounding Libyan-financed terror attacks against Americans and helped 
establish a path towards greater U.S. involvement in the country. Id. 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Slobodzian, supra note 10.  
 77 Id. Albert Votaw was a housing officer with the State Department’s Agency for International 
Development and was one of the sixty-three people killed when a car bomb exploded in the U.S. Em-
bassy in Beirut. Id. Votaw’s surviving relatives were part of a group of fifty-five people who jointly 
sued the Iranian government for their involvement in various terror attacks. Id. 
 78 Id. 
 79 See id. (reporting on plaintiffs suing to expand subsection (g) to attach the Persepolis Collec-
tion). American courts awarded judgments against Iran worth $46 billion by 2015 for their involve-
ment in terror attacks on American citizens. Id. 
 80 See Consolidated Appropriations Act § 404 (creating a compensation fund for victims of terror). 
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bill in part created a fund of over a billion dollars derived from a court settle-
ment with a French bank that admitted to helping numerous countries evade 
sanctions, including Iran and other state sponsors of terrorism.81 Both methods 
of receiving compensation—through diplomatic processes and through a com-
bination of the courts and new legislation—proved to be at least moderately 
effective for the plaintiffs involved.82 Yet, these strategies did not work for the 
Ben Yehuda bombing victims.83 
E. Background of Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran (Rubin IV) 
Many of the U.S. victims of the 1997 Ben Yehuda attack were severely 
injured and have been fighting for years to receive compensation from Iran.84 
The plaintiffs first filed a suit under the FSIA in 2001 in a district court of the 
                                                                                                                           
 81 Id.; Joseph Ax et al., U.S. Imposes Record Fine on BNP in Sanctions Warning to Banks, REU-
TERS, (June 10, 2014), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bnp-paribas-settlement/u-s-imposes-record-
fine-on-bnp-in-sanctions-warning-to-banks-idUSKBN0F52HA20140701 [https://perma.cc/4ALA-
8DQT]; Slobodzian, supra note 10; John Bellinger, Omnibus Bill Creates One Billion Dollar Fund for 
Victims of Terrorism (and Allows up to $250 Million to Go to Their Attorneys), LAW FARE BLOG 
(Dec. 28, 2015, 12:04 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/omnibus-bill-creates-one-billion-dollar-
fund-victims-terrorism-and-allows-250-million-go-their [https://perma.cc/NP8Y-8QV9]. There were, 
however, strings attached to the money. Slobodzian, supra note 10. No individual could receive more 
than $20 million and no family could receive more than $35 million. Id. Each claimant was also to 
receive 13.5% of the original settlement provided by the courts. Id. There are currently only four offi-
cially recognized state sponsors of terrorism: Iran, Syria, North Korea, and Sudan. Adam Taylor, 
North Korea’s On-Again-Off-Again Status as a State Sponsor of Terrorism, WASH. POST, (Nov. 20, 
2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/11/20/north-koreas-on-again-off-
again-status-as-a-state-sponsor-of-terrorism/?utm_term=.c5d0e42f028a [https://perma.cc/ZBT2-6NDT]. 
 82 See Libya Pays $1.5 Billion, supra note 70 (describing how victims received compensation 
through a diplomatic settlement between the U.S. and Libyan governments); Slobodzian, supra note 
10 (reporting on a group of victims who received compensation from a fund created by Congress); 
supra notes 73, 81 and accompanying text (describing success with diplomacy, the court system, and 
legislation). 
 83 See Rubin III, 830 F.3d at 473–74 (petitioning the Supreme Court because there were no other 
opportunities for victims of the Ben Yehuda bombing to receive compensation from the court’s hold-
ing regarding Iran’s liability). 
 84 See id. at 473 (discussing the $71.5 million judgment awarded to the victims); Campuzano v. 
Islamic Republic of Iran, 281 F. Supp. 2d 258, 261 (D.D.C. 2003) (describing how the Rubin plaintiffs 
first filed suit in 2000). Diana Campuzano was rushed to a nearby hospital with life-threatening inju-
ries. Campuzano, 281 F. Supp. 2d at 263–64. She had lost hearing, was blind, badly burned, and suf-
fered a massive skull fracture. Id. Avi Elishis suffered multiple lacerations and entry wounds from the 
bomb’s shrapnel (including a perforated lung), burns, and a ruptured eardrum. Id. at 264–65. Gregg 
Salzman suffered a perforated eardrum, numerous burns, and entry wounds from shrapnel causing 
permanent nerve damage and chronic pain. Id. at 265. Jenny Rubin suffered permanent tinnitus. Id. 
Daniel Miller suffered multiple shrapnel-caused entry wounds in his legs and had a piece of glass 
embedded in one eye. Id. at 266. Abraham Mendelson suffered a partially severed ear, multiple entry 
wounds from shrapnel, and multiple burns throughout his body. Id. Stuart Hersh suffered multiple 
entry wounds caused by shrapnel and multiple burns. Id. at 266–67. Noam Rozenman had burns cov-
ering over 40% of his body and suffered more than one hundred shrapnel entry wounds. Id. at 267. All 
of these individuals also suffered severe mental and psychological trauma, manifesting in cases of 
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, depression, and severe personality changes. Id. at 263–67. 
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District of Columbia and received a judgment of over seventy-one million dol-
lars to be paid by the government of Iran.85 The plaintiffs have been attempting 
to satisfy the judgment ever since, largely through seeking attachments on Ira-
nian properties located in the United States.86 The Supreme Court most recent-
ly affirmed a United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit decision 
concerning the plaintiff’s ability to attach the Persepolis Collection, a large 
collection of Persian artifacts held in the University of Chicago’s Oriental Col-
lection.87 The plaintiffs tried to force the sale of this collection and keep the 
money that Iran owes them from the original judgment.88 
The Seventh Circuit held in 2016 that § 1610(g) of the FSIA was not a 
freestanding exception to foreign sovereign immunity and thus denied the Ru-
bin plaintiffs their ability to raise funds by selling this collection.89 The court 
decided that any foreign state-owned property that plaintiffs tried to attach un-
der § 1610(g) as part of a state sponsor of terrorism exception needed to also 
meet the requirements of other parts of the statute.90 Specifically, the property 
had to have been used for a “commercial activity within the United States” as 
specified in § 1610(a) and (b).91 The statute describes seven distinct kinds of 
“commercial activity” that would allow the plaintiffs to access the property in 
question.92 Because the court did not find that the Persepolis Collection was 
                                                                                                                           
 85 Rubin III, 830 F.3d at 473. The Rubin and Campuzano plaintiffs had originally filed separate 
suits. Alyssa N. Speichert, Note, The Persepolis Complex: A Case for Making the Collections Process 
Easier Under Section 1610(g) of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act for Victims of Foreign State 
Sponsored Terrorism, 2017 MICH. ST. L. REV. 547, 558–59. Because both suits originated from the 
same incident, involved many of the same defendants, and concerned similar questions of law and 
fact, the D.C. circuit court consolidated both claims into one. Campuzano, 281 F. Supp. 2d 258, 260–
61. 
 86 Rubin III, 830 F.3d at 473–74. The Rubin plaintiffs previously attempted to file attachments 
against two domestic bank accounts used by the Iranian government and a similar collection of Per-
sian antiquities held at the Boston Museum of Fine Arts and Harvard University. Rubin III, 830 F.3d 
at 473; Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran (Rubin II), 709 F.3d 49, 51 (1st Cir. 2013). The Boston col-
lection included stone reliefs, sculptures, and other artifacts. Rubin II, 709 F.3d at 51. The United 
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit ruled against the Rubin plaintiffs, finding the property in 
question ineligible under the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 because it was not a “blocked 
asset.” Id. at 58. The court did not address the scope of § 1610(g)—the question that was at issue in 
the most recent Rubin case—because plaintiffs did not bring up the argument at the district court level 
or in their opening brief on appeal. Rubin III, 830 F.3d at 487; Rubin II, 709 F.3d at 54. 
 87 Rubin III, 830 F.3d at 474. The Persepolis Collection consists of roughly thirty thousand clay 
tablets and fragments that contain some of the oldest writings in the world. Id. They arrived in the 
United States over a sixty-year span starting in 1937. Id. 
 88 Id. at 473–75, 487. 
 89 Id. at 487. 
 90 Id. The Rubin plaintiffs first had to prove they sustained damages due to a state sponsored 
terrorist attack under § 1605A of the FSIA. Id. Once a court ruled that their claim fit within § 1605A, 
the victims then attempted—and failed—to sue under § 1610(g) alone to execute the judgment. Id. 
The victims’ claims needed to fit within § 1610(a), not just § 1610(g), to succeed. Id. 
 91 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)–(b). 
 92 Id. § 1610(a)(1)–(7). 
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used for any economic activity as defined in § 1610(a) and (b), it barred the 
plaintiffs from filing an execution or attachment on the Persepolis Collection.93 
This, however, created a split with a decision in the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.94 The Ninth Circuit held in 2016 in Bennett v. 
Islamic Republic of Iran that victims of terror could seek attachments to prop-
erty under § 1610(g) whether it met a separate § 1610 exception.95 It did not 
matter whether the property in question was used for a “commercial activity” 
if the foreign sovereign owner had materially supported a terrorist attack under 
§ 1605A and so fell into the § 1610(g) exception.96 This diametrically opposite 
outcome led to a positive result for the victims.97 Unlike the Rubin plaintiffs, 
the Bennett plaintiffs were able to access this contested property and could 
therefore collect at least part of the money the Iranian government owed to 
them for injuries they sustained due to acts of state sponsored terrorism.98 
Though the Rubin plaintiffs and the Iranian government had other disa-
greements, the Supreme Court addressed the circuit split issue.99 If the Court 
found § 1610(g) to be a freestanding exception, terrorism victims and their fami-
lies would have been able to seek attachment on numerous kinds of property.100 
The Court ruled differently, however, finding § 1610(g) entirely dependent on 
                                                                                                                           
 93 Rubin III, 830 F.3d at 487. 
 94 Rubin IV, 138 S. Ct. at 821 n.3. 
 95 Bennett, 825 F.3d at 959, 969. Four separate groups of plaintiffs in Bennett sued the govern-
ment of Iran for damages sustained from terrorist attacks it had supported. Id. at 956. The attacks 
included a 1996 bombing of the Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia, a 1990 mass shooting, a 2002 bomb-
ing of a cafeteria at Hebrew University in Jerusalem, and a 2001 bombing of a restaurant in Jerusalem. 
Id. The total damages awarded across all four lawsuits totaled about $973 million. Id. The plaintiffs 
sued to attach Iranian accounts at various companies. Id. at 954. Two companies, Visa and Franklin, 
owed close to $17 million to Bank Melli, a wholly state-owned bank that is also Iran’s largest finan-
cial institution. Id. at 957. The court found that the bank was an instrumentality of the Iranian gov-
ernment. Id. at 959. Therefore, the plaintiffs could attach the bank’s property held in the U.S. since 
their damages came from a state sponsored terrorist attack. Id. 
 96 Id. at 959, 965. 
 97 See Rubin III, 830 F.3d at 475 (holding plaintiffs could not execute their judgments); Bennett, 
825 F.3d at 959, 969 (holding plaintiffs could execute their judgments). 
 98 See Rubin III, 830 F.3d at 487 (holding that the plaintiffs could not sell the contested property 
to satisfy their judgments); Bennett, 825 F.3d at 959, 969 (holding that the plaintiffs could sell the 
contested property to satisfy a number of judgments from state sponsored terrorist attacks); supra note 
95–97 and accompanying text (explaining how and why the Bennett plaintiffs received compensa-
tion). 
 99 Rubin IV, 138 S. Ct. at 821. What constituted a commercial activity inside the United States—
and if the Persepolis collection fit within that definition—was another question that the Rubin plain-
tiffs included in their initial writ of certiori to the Supreme Court. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at ii, 
Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran (Rubin IV), 138 S. Ct. 816. (2018) (No. 16-534), https://www.scotus
blog.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/16-534-cert-petition.pdf [https://perma.cc/C4YR-AMXY]. The 
Court, however, ruled that they would only address the circuit split regarding § 1610(g). Rubin IV, 
138 S. Ct. at 821. 
 100 See Rubin IV, 138 S. Ct. at 825 (allowing access to the Persepolis Collection would also allow 
access to other property not used for a commercial activity in the United States). 
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the rest of the statute.101 Therefore, the Rubin plaintiffs, along with many others, 
need to keep searching for other avenues to receive compensation.102 
F. The Supreme Court’s Decision and Reasoning in Rubin v. Islamic 
Republic of Iran (Rubin IV) 
On February 21, 2018, the United States Supreme Court held in favor of 
the Iranian government in Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran (Rubin IV).103 In 
an 8–0 decision, Justice Sotomayor, writing for the Court, stated § 1610(g) was 
not an independent exception to foreign sovereign immunity when a victim of 
a state sponsored terror attack, as defined in § 1605A, sought to fulfill their 
judgment.104 After describing the Ben Yehuda bombing and the legislative his-
tory of the FSIA, the Court provided its reasoning for the opinion.105 
The Court began by holding the most logical reading of the statute’s lan-
guage results in § 1610(g)(1) limiting the scope of attachable property.106 The 
subsection stipulates that property is subject to attachment to execute a 
§ 1605A judgment “as provided in this section.”107 The Court determined that 
“this section” referred to § 1610 as a whole, which included the commercial 
activity requirement in § 1610(a) and (b).108 Without any “textual markers” 
that segregated it from the rest of the FSIA, the justices read § 1610(g) to be 
dependent on the other exceptions throughout the statute.109 
Furthermore, the Court reasoned that any other interpretation of the stat-
ute would make other sections superfluous.110 It also dismissed plaintiffs’ 
counterarguments about alternative statutory interpretation.111 After discussing 
why its own interpretation of the statute would not lead to any superfluous lan-
guage, the Court ended its opinion by noting that Congress’s intent for the 
                                                                                                                           
 101 See id. at 827 (holding that § 1610(g) is not a freestanding exception). 
 102 See id. (holding plaintiffs could not collect by attaching the Persepolis Collection thereby 
forcing them to look for alternatives to execute their judgment). 
 103 Id. at 816, 821. 
 104 Id. at 819–21. Justice Kagan recused herself from the case. Id. at 827. 
 105 Id. at 816–27. 
 106 Id. at 823–24. 
 107 28 U.S.C. § 1610(g)(1); Rubin IV, 138 S. Ct. at 823–24. 
 108 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)–(e); Rubin IV, 138 S. Ct. at 823–24. 
 109 Rubin IV, 138 S. Ct. at 823–24. 
 110 Id. at 824. 
 111 Id. at 824–27. The Court dismissed plaintiffs’ arguments that “as provided by this section” 
refers to § 1610(f) rather than § 1610 as a whole, even though that view was supported by the Ninth 
Circuit in its Bennett decision. Rubin IV, 138 S. Ct. at 825–26; see Bennett, 825 F.3d at 959 (ruling 
that subsection (g) had a scope independent of the “commercial activity” requirement seen elsewhere 
in the statute). Similarly, the justices declined to read any implied intent into § 1610(g) because other 
sections within § 1610 explicitly outline the parameters of property eligible for attachment. Rubin IV, 
138 S. Ct. at 825. Because § 1610(g) did not explicitly and universally eliminate foreign sovereign 
immunity for litigants who received § 1605A judgments, the Court did not want to read one into the 
statute. Id. at 825–27. 
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scope of § 1610(g) was not as broad as the plaintiffs contended.112 The Court 
failed to examine the broader landscape of compensating victims of terror, 
leaving unanswered questions for the Rubin plaintiffs, and those similarly situ-
ated, in their pursuit of justice.113 
II. WHY ANSWERING THIS QUESTION IN FAVOR OF THE VICTIMS WOULD 
HAVE BEEN CRITICAL TO PRESENT AND FUTURE VICTIMS OF TERROR 
Currently, victims of terror lack any effective path to receive compensa-
tion for the injuries they and their loved ones have suffered.114 Although at first 
glance there are a myriad of avenues for victims to pursue and large sums of 
money that they could access, closer inspection reveals that none of these op-
tions are practically available, fair, or reliable.115 It was imperative for the 
United States Supreme Court in Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran (Rubin IV) to 
recognize this predicament and interpret § 1610(g) to create a precedent that 
would have compelled foreign sovereign countries who have materially sup-
ported acts of terrorism to compensate victims for injuries they sustained.116 
                                                                                                                           
 112 Rubin IV, 138 S. Ct. at 825–27. The plaintiffs argued the phrase “property of a foreign state” 
in § 1610(g)(1) would be rendered meaningless if the section did not remove immunity from all forms 
of foreign-owned property. Id. at 826–27. The whole point of revoking the Bancec factors in subsec-
tions (A)–(E) was to cover property owned by foreign agents or instrumentalities. Id. at 827. There 
would be no reason to include the phrase “property of the foreign state” if § 1610(g) did not also cover 
kinds of property that would actually be owned by a foreign government. See id. (considering whether 
any other interpretation would make the phrase superfluous). The Court rejected this argument, 
though, stating the phrase was more of an umbrella designed to cover the property addressed in 
Bancec and in subsections (A)–(E). Id. The scope of eligible property was somewhat expanded 
through the repeal of the Bancec factors in (A)–(E), and the Court found that to be enough to satisfy 
the stated intent to remove obstacles between the victims and their rightful compensation. Id. 
 113 See id. at 816–27 (failing to discuss other kinds of victim repayment while not acknowledging 
the lack of realistic and reliable options for plaintiffs to pursue moving forward). 
 114 See Bradley, supra note 12 (discussing how victims of Sudanese-sponsored attacks failed to 
benefit from a diplomatic deal between the U.S. and Sudanese governments); Consolidated Appropri-
ations Act § 404 (providing a common fund for victims to receive compensation after a large buildup 
of unsatisfied judgments from terrorist attacks); Libya Pays $1.5 Billion, supra note 70 (examining 
how victims eventually received compensation from a diplomatic settlement); Slobodzian, supra note 
10 (reporting how victims and their families struggled to receive compensation after being awarded 
judgments from U.S. courts); supra notes 70–83 and accompanying text (explaining the shortcomings 
of other methods victims have tried to receive compensation). 
 115 See Consolidated Appropriations Act § 404 (grouping many different plaintiffs from multiple 
attacks together after many years without effective action against pending terrorism-related judg-
ments); Harris, supra note 21 (explaining other motivations that lead to a diplomatic agreement be-
tween the United States and Sudan that excluded any compensation for victims of Sudanese-
sponsored terrorist attacks); Libya Pays $1.5 Billion, supra note 70; (detailing a perfect storm of cir-
cumstances that led to a diplomatic agreement); Slobodzian, supra note 10 (reporting that victims of 
Iranian-sponsored terror agreements waited for decades to receive a judgment and were largely forgot-
ten by the general public); supra notes 70–83 and accompanying text (detailing why and how these 
methods failed). 
 116 See Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran (Rubin IV), 138 S. Ct. 816, 816–27 (2018) (failing to 
consider the consequences of the decision for the victims). This solution is even more appealing when 
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By allowing victims of terror to attach foreign-owned property that was not 
used for a commercial activity, more sources of funding would have been 
available and more innocent victims would have been able to receive compen-
sation for their injuries.117 
This section explains why the existing solutions for the Rubin plaintiffs, 
and others in similar situations, are unreliable and inadequate.118 Subsection A 
lays out the argument that diplomatic settlements have not, and will not, solve 
the current situation.119 Subsection B explains why legislative actions are not 
effective.120 Finally, Subsection C analyzes the inefficacy of lower court rul-
ings.121 
A. Shortcomings of Diplomatic Agreements 
Diplomatic solutions to compensation problems are difficult to reach, but 
they do provide clearer paths for victims to navigate so they receive at least 
some compensation.122 Rather than going through the court system and 
fighting a foreign government like the Rubin plaintiffs, the victims of the 
                                                                                                                           
compared with the alternative of the status quo, which involves competing foreign policy interests, 
individual judges’ opinions of ambiguous statutes, or fighting amongst fellow victims for a small slice 
of the pie. See Bennett v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 825 F.3d 949, 959 (9th Cir. 2016) (expanding the 
scope of eligible property under subsection (g)), abrogated by Rubin IV, 138 S. Ct. 816 (2018); supra 
notes 70–83 (detailing why other methods for receiving compensation have been ineffective). Indeed, 
the United Nations has specifically highlighted victims of terror and has called on member nations to 
help support them by publishing a report and convening a working group for these individuals. BAN 
KI-MOON, U.N. SEC’Y GEN., SUPPORTING VICTIMS OF TERRORISM (2009), http://www.un.org/en/
terrorism/ctitf/pdfs/un_report_supporting_victims_terrorism.pdf [https://perma.cc/L6MV-9SC9]. As 
part of the U.N.’s “Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy,” it is vitally important to provide some kind of 
“normalization” through compensation to combat the “dehumanization” that they experienced because 
of the given attack. Id. 
 117 See generally Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 24 (arguing for a broader scope of attachable 
property that would generate more opportunities for victims to receive compensation without signifi-
cant downside); supra notes 177–219 and accompanying text (describing why the Supreme Court 
came to the wrong conclusion and what it would have meant to rule differently). 
 118 See supra notes 122–175 and accompanying text. 
 119 See supra notes 122–139 and accompanying text. 
 120 See supra notes 142–160 and accompanying text. 
 121 See supra notes 163–175 and accompanying text. 
 122 See Libya Pays $1.5 Billion, supra note 70 (the families of Lockerbie bombing victims re-
ceived some money as payment for their damages without having to sue for execution, though it took 
about twenty years to receive compensation). According to the article, a group of relatives of the Pan 
Am victims who died in the plane bombing were pleased that the Libyan government honored the 
agreement and expressed gratitude for Senator Lautenberg’s efforts to push the U.S. government to 
finalize the deal. Id. Senator Lautenberg is a Democratic senator from New Jersey who co-sponsored 
the Libyan Claims Resolution Act, a piece of legislation that paired with the diplomatic agreement to 
end the dispute between the United States and Libya and helped create the victim compensation fund 
that drew from the money in the agreement. Libyan Claims Resolution Act, Pub. L. No. 110–301, 122 
Stat 2999 (2008); 154 CONG. REC. S3797 (daily ed. July 31, 2008) (statement of Sen. Klobuchar); 
Libya Pays $1.5 Billion, supra note 70. 
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Lockerbie bombing simply needed to prove to the court that: 1) the terrorist 
attack was state sponsored; and 2) they suffered an injury.123 They did not need 
to fight to access property that they would compel their adversary to sell to 
satisfy the judgment.124 Instead, they only had to ensure that they be counted as 
one of the victims eligible for the payments.125 
An arrangement similar to the Lockerbie bombing settlement is not a so-
lution for people like the Rubin plaintiffs.126 There must be a confluence of 
events—like a favorable business environment and unrelated political fac-
tors—that creates a perfect storm for an agreement like this one to be made.127 
The Lockerbie bombing is a rare example of a diplomatic deal between the 
United States and another country creating a fund with money coming from a 
foreign state that was specifically designated for victims of state sponsored 
terror attacks.128 
                                                                                                                           
 123 See Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran (Rubin III), 830 F.3d 470, 487 (7th Cir. 2016) (suing for 
access to the Persepolis Collection), aff’d, 138 S. Ct. 816 (2018); Campuzano v. Islamic Republic of 
Iran, 281 F. Supp. 2d 258, 269–70 (D.D.C. 2003) (holding plaintiffs were entitled to monetary dam-
ages after they proved they sustained injuries as victims of a state sponsored terror attack); Libya Pays 
$1.5 Billion, supra note 70 (noting the Libyan government paid damages to victims of the bombing). 
 124 Compare Rubin III, 830 F.3d at 487 (using the court system to execute their judgment), with 
Libya Pays $1.5 Billion, supra note 70 (noting the Lockerbie plaintiffs went through diplomatic routes 
rather than the court system to execute their judgments). 
 125 See 28 U.S.C. § 1605A (2012) (foreign states are not immune from paying monetary damages 
for actions related to the material support of terrorism); § 1610(g) (regarding claims arising from 
§ 1605A); Libya Pays $1.5 Billion (reporting on a group of easily identifiable victims, which seeming-
ly made it easier for their families to come forward and be verified). 
 126 Compare Libya Pays $1.5 Billion, supra note 70 (describing various diplomatic and business 
interests that converged to create a climate uniquely favorable to a settlement that included terrorist 
victim compensation), with Rubin IV, 138 S. Ct. 816 (2018) (describing circumstances that did not 
include comparable foreign policy and economic interests). See also supra notes 111–112 and accom-
panying text (describing the plaintiffs’ arguments and the Court’s reasoning). 
 127 See Libya Pays $1.5 Billion, supra note 70 (reporting that the U.S. business community was 
invested in this outcome and wanted to regain access to the Libyan market, spurring U.S. diplomats to 
come to an agreement). 
 128 See Bradley, supra note 12 (discussing how victims of Sudanese-sponsored attacks failed to 
benefit from a diplomatic deal between the U.S. and Sudanese governments); Broder, supra note 21 
(noting victims of separate Iranian-sponsored terror attacks were compensated through U.S. funds 
rather than Iranian assets). A confluence of motivations and international events have to collide to 
provide motivation for all parties involved to come to the table for negotiations. See Libya Pays $1.5 
Billion, supra note 70 (highlighting how the deal allowed U.S. businesses to have greater access to the 
country and helped to normalize relations between the two governments). The United States also ex-
erted extra pressure on Libya because Congress was set to pass legislation that would allow victims of 
terror to attach frozen government assets in the country. See Elise Labott, U.S. Libya Deal Closes 
Book on Lockerbie, CNN (Aug. 14, 2008), http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:
Ms9JVFCm2UUJ:www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/africa/08/14/lockerbie/index.html&hl=en&gl=us&
strip=1&vwsrc=0 [https://perma.cc/N8ZW-ENHZ] (reporting on the legislation and how it would 
have affected Libya). By reaching this agreement, Libya would be exempt from the law and have its 
sovereign immunity restored. Id. 
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Other large diplomatic deals have tried to follow the Libyan model by in-
cluding admissions of responsibility and forfeiture of funds, but none have 
achieved similar results for victims.129 The U.S. government came to an 
agreement with the government of Iran near the end of the Obama Administra-
tion that kept Iran from creating a nuclear weapon in exchange for lifting eco-
nomic sanctions against the country.130 This was not all that came from diplo-
matic negotiations, however, as a second and lesser-known deal relieved the 
Iranians from their obligation to pay roughly four hundred million dollars in 
damages to U.S. victims of terrorist attacks carried out by Iranian proxies.131 
United States diplomats in the Trump Administration face a high degree 
of pressure when negotiating diplomatic agreements involving victims of ter-
ror.132 In 2016, House Judiciary Chairman Bob Goodlatte and Senate Judiciary 
Chairman Chuck Grassley wrote a joint letter to Secretary of State Rex Tiller-
son urging the administration to secure an agreement with the government of 
Sudan to compensate American victims of terror who have sustained damages 
from attacks carried out by Sudanese-supported groups.133 Unfortunately, for 
                                                                                                                           
 129 Letter from Bob Goodlatte, House of Representatives Judiciary Comm. Chairman & Chuck 
Grassley, Senate Judiciary Comm. Chairman to Rex Tillerson, Sec’y of State (Sept. 27, 2017), https://
www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/2017-09-27%20CEG,%20Goodlatte%20to%20Tillerson
(Sudan%20Sanctions).pdf [https://perma.cc/5M67-9TDA] (hereafter Letter from Bob Goodlatte); 
(calling for Sudan to provide for victims of terror as part of any diplomatic agreement); Bradley supra 
note 12 (reporting that victims argued that the U.S. government squandered leverage that could have 
led the Sudanese to compensate victims of Sudanese-sponsored terror attacks); Broder, supra note 21 
(reporting that a diplomatic deal between Iran and the United States forgave the Iranian government’s 
debts regarding the repayment of damages for certain victims of Iranian-sponsored terrorist attacks). 
 130 See Iran Nuclear Deal: Key Details, BBC, (Oct. 13, 2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-
middle-east-33521655 [https://perma.cc/6JJP-YLY6] (reporting on the agreement also including five 
other world powers). The deal included United Kingdom, France, Germany, Russia, and China, and 
called for Iran to reduce the number of centrifuges it uses to extract uranium, reduce the amount of 
weapons-grade uranium and plutonium, and become more transparent in its nuclear activities. Id. 
 131 Broder, supra note 21. In 1979, the United States seized $400 million in Iranian funds after the 
1979 Islamic revolution. Id. Victims of terror felt “betrayed” because the U.S. government alone paid 
the court judgments to American victims of Iranian-sponsored terrorist attacks, despite promises that 
the money would come from the Iranian funds. Id. The Iranian deal returned the seized money to Iran 
instead of allocating it to the victims. Id. In other words, the American people ended up footing the 
entire bill, and the Iranians paid nothing. Id. One Obama Administration official justified the decision 
by saying that the original plan in 2000 called for the damage claims to satisfy the United States, 
which the settlement did. Id. The Americans repaid the $400 million plus an extra $1.3 billion in in-
terest for a total payment of $1.7 billion. Id. 
 132 See Letter from Bob Goodlatte, supra note 129 (exerting pressure on the Administration to 
ensure that victims of terror were compensated). 
 133 Id. According to the press release accompanying the letter, the Sudanese government sheltered 
and materially supported Al-Qaeda members in the years preceding the 1998 Al-Qaeda-sponsored bomb-
ings of the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Press Release, Office of Senator Chuck Grass-
ley, Grassley, Goodlatte Urge Administration to Seek Guarantees for Victims Before Lifting Terrorism-
Related Sanctions on Sudan (Oct. 3, 2017), https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/
grassley-goodlatte-urge-administration-seek-guarantees-victims-lifting-terrorism [https://perma.cc/
5RMU-5DV4]. Victims have filed suit under the FSIA and have won judgments in American courts. 
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these victims, they were not part of the deal between the two countries that was 
announced on October 6, 2017.134 
The agreement lifted economic sanctions against Sudan in a show of 
goodwill after the Sudanese government’s efforts to maintain peace and dis-
tance itself from terrorist organizations.135 Many diplomats and academics 
supported the deal, including those who worked in the Obama Administration, 
but the families and representatives of these victims did not receive it well.136 
The Trump Administration, and many others in the African foreign affairs 
community, argued that the new agreement reflected a different and improving 
reality within Sudan.137 Victim families and advocates, however, admonished 
the government for ignoring their interests.138 The circumstances between the 
Iranian and Sudanese agreements were different, but both groups of affected 
victims were dissatisfied with the result.139 
B. Shortcomings of Legislative Solutions 
Legislative solutions, like diplomatic agreements, are not a reliable or ef-
fective method to ensure financial compensation for the victims of terror at-
tacks sponsored by foreign sovereigns.140 Congress has repeatedly attempted to 
create legislation to help victims in one of two ways; either by creating inde-
pendent funds that the victims can access or by making it easier to sue foreign 
sovereigns.141 Neither of these methods have proven to be effective, and the 
                                                                                                                           
Id. Representative Goodlatte is a Republican from Virginia, while Senator Grassley is a Republican 
from Iowa. Id. 
 134 Harris, supra note 21. 
 135 Id. 
 136 Bradley, supra note 12; Harris, supra note 21.  
 137 Harris, supra note 21. Specifically, administration officials pointed out that the government 
was no longer attacking civilians in Darfur, was no longer destabilizing South Sudan, and was collab-
orating with the U.S. government on counterterrorism activities. Id. 
 138 Bradley, supra note 12; Harris, supra note 21.  
 139 See Bradley, supra note 12 (expressing anger that the Trump Administration did not use lever-
age against the Sudanese to get compensation payments for victims); Broder, supra note 21 (reporting 
the unhappiness of the victims when they found out that Iran would not be compensating for their 
damages); Harris, supra note 21 (arguing that the victims were ignored). 
 140 See Broder, supra note 21 (reporting that the Obama Administration paid back money to the 
Iranian government instead of using it to satisfy pending judgments regarding Iranian-sponsored ter-
rorist attacks.) Victims of these attacks did receive compensation, but the money came from U.S. 
taxpayers and not from the party responsible for their damages. Broder, supra note 21. Similarly, the 
Trump Administration came to a diplomatic agreement with the Sudanese government that lifted eco-
nomic sanctions as a reward for good behavior without receiving any settlements for pending judg-
ments filed by U.S. victims of Sudanese-sponsored terrorist attacks. Harris, supra note 21. On the 
other hand, legislation meant to provide compensation to victims of terror attacks are ineffective be-
cause they pit victims against each other and do not have enough money to fully compensate everyone 
affected. Rodriguez, supra note 12, at 5–7. 
 141 See 28 U.S.C. § 1610 (describing exceptions to foreign sovereign immunity); In re Sept. 11 
Litig., 600 F. Supp. 2d 549, 551 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (describing how Congress enacted a bill that includ-
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limited success of these attempts only underscore the Supreme Court’s missed 
opportunity in Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran (Rubin IV) to create a solution 
for victims.142 
Shortly after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 that took the lives 
of 2,752 individuals, Congress enacted the Air Transportation Safety and Sta-
bilization Act (ATSSA), which created the September 11th Victims Compensa-
tion Fund (VCF).143 The legislation was meant to provide compensation for 
victims and their families, but it also protected the airlines involved from end-
less lawsuits that would have likely destabilized the U.S. airline industry.144 
The fund, on the surface, was largely successful, as many victims successfully 
filed claims and were granted payments.145 The process of applying for and 
receiving money, however, was not without controversy.146 Each victim had to 
                                                                                                                           
ed a compensation fund for victims of 9/11); Rodriguez, supra note 12, at 5–6 (describing how com-
mon funds are distributed). Examples of this kind of legislation include the Air Transportation Safety 
and System Stabilization Act (“ATSSSA”) (intending to provide compensation to victims of the 9/11 
attacks) and the James Zadroga 9/11, Health and Compensation Act of 2010 (intending to provide 
compensation to the first responders of the 9/11 attacks). James Zadroga 9/11, Health and Compensa-
tion Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111–347, 124 Stat. 3623 (codifed as amended 42 U.S.C. § 300mm) 
(2012)) [hereinafter Zadroga Act]; Air Transportation Safety and Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107–
42, 115 Stat. 230 (2001); In re Sep. 11 Litig., 600 F. Supp. 2d at 551; Rodriguez, supra note 12, at 5–
7. 
 142 See 28 U.S.C. § 1610(g) (eliminating the Bancec factors that had occasionally kept victims 
from attaching property owned by foreign sovereign instrumentalities); Rubin IV, 138 S. Ct. at 820 
(holding that § 1610 did not include a freestanding exception to sovereign immunity in subsection 
(g)); Rodriguez, supra note 12, at 5–6 (discussing the problems victims face when trying to access 
compensation held in common funds). 
 143 ATSSSA § 402-07; In re Sept. 11 Litig., 600 F. Supp. 2d at 551. 
 144 See In re September 11 Litig., 600 F. Supp. 2d at 551 (holding that the number of claimants 
and claims threatened the stability of the American aviation industry). Speaking on the Senate floor on 
September 21, 2001, Senator John McCain said: 
In addition to removing the specter of devastating potential liability from the airlines, 
and guaranteeing that the victims and their families will receive compensation regard-
less of the outcomes of the tangle of lawsuits that will ensue, the bill attempts to pro-
vide some sense to the litigation by consolidating all civil litigation arising from the ter-
rorist attacks of September 11 in one court. 
In re Sept. 11 Litig., 567 F. Supp. 2d at 619 (quoting 147 CONG. REC. S9589-01, S9594 (daily ed. 
Sept. 21, 2001) (statement of Senator McCain). To protect the airlines, the ATSSA included a non-
negotiable clause that individuals could only access the Victims Compensation Fund (VCF) if they 
agreed to never sue the airlines. ATSSA § 405(c)(3)(B)(i). According to the statute, claimants agreed 
to waive their right to sue for damages stemming from the 9/11 attacks in any federal or state court 
when they submitted a claim. Id. 
 145 See September 11th Victim Aid and Compensation Fast Facts, CNN (Aug. 31, 2017), https://
www.cnn.com/2013/07/27/us/september-11th-victim-aid-and-compensation-fast-facts/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/936X-TU9N] (detailing how many victims filed claims and how much money was 
awarded). From 2001 through 2003, the fund granted 5,560 out of 7,408 claims for a total amount 
over $7 billion. Id. 
 146 See Rodriguez, supra note 12, at 6 (reporting on victims who were confounded by the com-
pensation distribution). 
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file an individual claim.147 This created an adversarial atmosphere, causing 
victims to compete with one another for claims.148 “Special master” Kenneth 
Feinberg sifted through the claims and tried to compensate everyone as best as 
he, and the fund, could.149 He created a formula that included the victim’s age, 
health and income to come up with a valuation that could be used to determine 
their claim.150 
This pattern repeated itself nearly a decade later, when Congress passed 
the James Zadroga 9/11 Health and Compensation Act of 2010 (Zadroga 
bill).151 The Zadroga bill was meant to provide for first responders to 9/11 who 
got sick from their actions, in much the same way the VCF did for victims.152 
It created an almost three billion dollar fund to provide compensation for 
claimants and expanded the original VCF, using a similar claims system to de-
termine who was entitled to what amount.153 Again, Congress failed to provide 
                                                                                                                           
 147 Id. 
 148 Id. 
 149 See id. (reporting how he created a system using a number of factors to determine the appro-
priate award for each claim). Kenneth Feinberg was a lawyer appointed to oversee the VCF. Id. The 
fund was created less than two weeks after the September 11th attacks and did not provide Feinberg 
much guidance. Id. There was no legal precedent for such a fund, and Congress only passed a sparse 
statute with few details to help guide his decision-making. Id. 
 150 Id. Feinberg has worked on a number of similar incidents since administering the VCF. Id. He 
managed claims for the 2010 BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, the 2013 Boston Marathon Bombing, 
as well as the $1.05 billion fund for other victims of terror that drew from the $8.9 billion forfeiture 
agreement between the United States and BNP Paribas SA—a French bank that had close ties to ter-
rorism financing. Rodriguez, supra note 12, at 6; Slobodzian, supra note 10. 
 151 See Zadroga Act, Tit. II, § 202 (codified as amended 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (2012)) (creating a 
common fund for first responders); supra note 150 (creating a formula after being appointed to lead a 
compensation fund). 
 152 Compare Zadroga Act, Tit. I, § 3301 (providing financial support to first responders of 9/11), 
with ATSSA § 405(c)(3)(B)(i) (attempting to do the same for victims). The Zadroga bill’s purpose 
was to provide: 
(1) medical monitoring and treatment benefits to eligible emergency responders and re-
covery and cleanup workers (including those who are Federal employees) who re-
sponded to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks; and (2) initial health evaluation, 
monitoring, and treatment benefits to residents and other building occupants and area 
workers in New York City who were directly impacted and adversely affected by such 
attacks. 
Zadroga Act, Tit. I, § 3301. 
 153 SHEILA L. BIRNBAUM, FIRST ANNUAL STATUS REPORT: SEPTEMBER 11TH VICTIM COMPEN-
SATION FUND (2012), https://www.vcf.gov/pdf/VCFStatusReportOct2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/
5DMJ-AQF6]; see Zadroga Act, Tit. II, § 202 (creating an expanded fund including first responders); 
ATSSA § 405(c)(3)(B)(i) (creating a common fund where victims could file claims for compensa-
tion); Rodriguez, supra note 12, at 5–6 (describing the mechanics of the 9/11 VCF). 
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significant guidance.154 Sheila Birnbaum, the new special master for the fund, 
had to create a system that again pitted victim against victim.155 
Congress has also attempted, and failed, to craft legislation that would 
create a clear legal path for victims of terror to use to receive compensation 
from foreign sovereigns.156 The FSIA is an example of the legislative branch’s 
well-meaning intentions and its inability to effectively put these good ideas 
into practice.157 Much of the language in the FSIA, especially regarding what 
is and is not a stand-alone exception to foreign sovereign immunity from 
judgments, is ambiguous at best.158 This led to the main disagreement between 
the Seventh Circuit in the Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran (Rubin III) deci-
sion and the Ninth Circuit in Bennett v. Islamic Republic of Iran, as both courts 
came to different interpretations of the same statutory language.159 The differ-
ent interpretations exemplify Congress’s failure to effectively communicate 
their intentions in the FSIA legislation.160 
C. Shortcomings of Judicial Solutions 
Many of the same problems that have plagued diplomatic and legislative 
attempts to provide clarity to victims of terror have also effected the courts’ 
                                                                                                                           
 154 See Rodriguez, supra note 12, at 6–7 (noting that Birnbaum had to create a system for distrib-
uting the funds nearly out of whole cloth). 
 155 Id. 
 156 See 28 U.S.C. § 1610 (carving out exceptions for victims of state sponsored terrorist attacks). 
 157 See id. (intending to provide victims of terror with a significantly easier path towards recov-
ery); Rubin IV, 138 S. Ct. at 820, 827 (holding that the expansions in the FSIA do not cover the Per-
sepolis Collection and so forcing the Rubin plaintiffs to continue their decades-long search for com-
pensation). Many, including the Supreme Court, have argued that Congress did not intend to allow all 
property to be attachable, but that reading seems doubtful in light of the goal of compensating victims. 
Rubin IV, 138 S. Ct. at 827; H.R. REP. NO. 110-477, at 1001 (2007). 
 158 Compare Rubin III, 830 F.3d at 487 (holding that § 1610(g) was not a stand-alone exception), 
with Gates v. Syrian Arab Republic, 755 F.3d 568, 576 (7th Cir. 2014) (holding that § 1610(g) was a 
stand-alone exception), overruled by Rubin III, 830 F.3d 470 (7th Cir. 2016), aff’d, 138 S. Ct. 816 
(2018). This disparity in two decisions by the same circuit just a few years apart demonstrates the 
ambiguity of the FSIA. See Rubin III, 830 F.3d at 487 (reversing precedent within the same circuit). In 
a 2014 decision regarding U.S. victims of Syrian government-sponsored terrorist attacks, the Seventh 
Circuit held in Gates that § 1610(g) allowed plaintiffs to attach assets held by the agencies and in-
strumentalities of state sponsors of terrorism even if factors described in § 1610(a) and (b) that would 
otherwise provide immunity existed. 755 F.3d at 576. 
 159 Compare Rubin III, 830 F.3d at 487 (holding that acts of state sponsored terror only exposes 
foreign-owned property to attachment if it is located in the United States, used for commercial activi-
ty, and if the foreign actor is the party actually commercially using the property in question), with 
Bennett, 825 F.3d at 959, 965 (holding that any foreign-owned property located in the United States is 
eligible to be attached if the owner is a state sponsor of terror, regardless of what party uses the prop-
erty and for what purpose it is used). 
 160 See Rubin III, 830 F.3d at 484 (contradicting its own decision in Gates that was published two 
years before Rubin); Bennett, 825 F.3d at 959, 965 (reflecting a different interpretation of 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1610). 
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attempts to do the same.161 The Seventh Circuit in particular has been unable to 
create a consistent precedent that both adheres to the law and provides fair 
compensation for victims of terror.162 Courts often provide judgments in favor 
of plaintiffs for millions of dollars only for the judgments to languish for dec-
ades because there is no clear legal way for the judgments to be fulfilled.163 
Occasionally, a windfall of money will become available but often falls short 
of compensating all plaintiffs possessing valid judgments.164 
                                                                                                                           
 161 See Rubin III, 830 F.3d at 484 (struggling to understand what Congress meant when determin-
ing if certain property falls into a state sponsor of terrorism exception); supra notes 72–83 (examples 
of issues faced by legislative and judicial attempts to fix the problem). 
 162 See Rubin III, 830 F.3d at 484 (breaking precedent just two years after it was created). 
 163 See Gates, 755 F.3d at 571 (discussing the hunt to find compensation after a judgment has 
been awarded); Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran (Rubin II), 709 F.3d 49, 50–51 (1st Cir. 2013) (re-
counting the initial judgment and the subsequent efforts by the Rubin plaintiffs to receive the money 
to which they are entitled); Slobodzian, supra note 10 (reporting on victims who waited years to re-
ceive settlements they had been awarded in court). There can be an enormous backlog of victims who 
are legally entitled to compensation who then come together to form a massive group in an attempt to 
get a lump-sum judgment or agreement that would create a fund for them to access. See Vivian Wang, 
Manhattan Skyscraper Linked to Iran Can Be Seized by U.S., Jury Finds, N.Y. TIMES (July 29, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/29/nyregion/650-fifth-avenue-iran-terrorism.html [https://perma.
cc/U7L4-ZXQ7] (reporting how the case combined multiple lawsuits filed by the government and 
other victims of Iranian-sponsored terrorism). This happened in the BNP Paribas SA agreement, as 
well as the 650 Fifth Avenue litigation discussed below. See Wang, supra (discussing lots of terrorist 
victims’ groups coming together); Rodriguez, supra note 12, at 7 (reporting that the fund should be 
meant for a wide array of victims). 
 164 See Gates, 755 F.3d at 571 (discussing how the two parties of victims are competing with one 
another for the same money); Slobodzian, supra note 10 (reporting how different groups of victims 
were not fully compensated for their judgments). There have been common funds for the BNP Paribas 
SA agreement, the September 11th Victims Compensation Fund, the September 11th First Responders 
Fund, and will likely be one as a result of the 650 Fifth Avenue forfeiture. Rubin III, 830 F.3d at 484; 
Birnbaum, supra note 153; Rodriguez, supra note 12, at 5–7; September 11th Victim Aid and Com-
pensation Fast Facts, supra note 145; Wang, supra note 163. This can lead to victims directly suing 
one another to determine who can access the pool of designated funds first. Gates, 755 F.3d at 570. 
This is a literal example of the competition between victims that was discussed previously regarding 
the 9/11 victims’ and first responders’ compensation funds. See id. (litigating a dispute between two 
groups of victims over compensation funds); BIRNBAUM, supra note 153 (detailing how a common 
fund would be distributed to first responders); Rodriguez, supra note 12, at 5–7 (reporting on the 
limited money available to 9/11 victims). 
 The appellants in Gates were the Baker plaintiffs. Gates, 755 F.3d at 570. Their case began in 
1985 when terrorists from a Syrian government-backed terrorist group called Abu Nidal hijacked an 
EgyptAir flight. Id. After landing in a Maltese airport, an armed standoff ensued that led the terrorists 
to shoot Patrick Scott Baker, Jackie Nink Pflug, and Scarlett Marie Rogenkamp. Id. Baker and Pflug 
survived, while Rogenkamp died along with fifty-seven other passengers and crew members. Id. The 
appellees were the Gates plaintiffs, decedents of Olin Armstrong, and Jack Hensley. Id. Armstrong 
and Hensley were military contractors who were beheaded in September of 2004 by al-Qaeda in Iraq, 
another Syrian government-sponsored group. Id. The Seventh Circuit ruled in favor of the Gates 
plaintiffs, deciding they had a priority lien against Syrian government-owned property in the U.S. Id. 
at 580–81. That the two parties were forced to race against each other to file attachments against vari-
ous Syrian-owned properties in the United States shows how broken this system of victim compensa-
tion has become. See id. at 571 (litigating a fight between two groups of victims over limited re-
sources). 
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One recent example of this pattern played out in the summer of 2017, 
when the Southern District of New York ruled that the Iranian-based Atavi 
Foundation was legally compelled to sell its sixty percent ownership stake in a 
skyscraper in Manhattan located at 650 Park Avenue.165 The expected one bil-
lion dollars that would be raised from the sale of the ownership interest in the 
building, coupled with seizing a number of related real estate properties and 
Iranian-held bank accounts scattered across the United States, will be used to 
satisfy judgments in favor of American victims of Iranian state sponsored ter-
rorist attacks.166 
This judgment succeeded where the Rubin IV case fell short because the 
property in question (650 Fifth Avenue) was used by an instrumentality of the 
Iranian government for a commercial activity and therefore fulfilled an appli-
cable exception outlined in the FSIA.167 The Persepolis Collection, on the oth-
er hand, which is the property at issue in the Rubin cases, did not meet the 
commercial activity standard and so has forced the Rubin plaintiffs to argue 
that property does not need to be used for commercial activity at all to be eli-
gible for attachment under the FSIA.168 The Rubin plaintiffs theorized that any 
property owned by Iran in the United States should have been eligible for at-
                                                                                                                           
 165 Linda Barr O’Flanagan, Government Gets Go-Ahead to Sell Iran-Linked 650 Fifth, REAL EST. 
WKLY. (July 3, 2017), https://rew-online.com/2017/07/government-gets-go-ahead-to-sell-iran-linked-
650-fifth/ [https://perma.cc/QRT3-KRZ9]; Wang, supra note 163. The court found that, although the 
building was owned by Atavi and not by the Iranian government, there was enough evidence to show 
that the two were heavily intertwined. O’Flanagan, supra. Atavi would use its assets to funnel mil-
lions of dollars from the United States into Iranian government bank accounts. Id. For this reason, the 
court considered 650 Fifth Avenue, and assorted other bank accounts throughout the United States, to 
be property of the Iranian government. Id. Atavi and the Iranian government are expected to appeal 
this decision. Id. 
 166 Wang, supra note 163. This ruling created what some are calling the largest terrorism related 
civil forfeiture in United States history. O’Flanagan, supra note 165; Wang, supra note 163. The 
property is unquestionably valuable, as evidenced by Nike’s recent announcement that it would open a 
flagship store in the first five stories of the building. Emily Price, Nike Will Close Its Flagship NYC 
Store in Spring, New One Coming in 2019, FORTUNE (Dec. 4, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/12/04/
nike-will-close-its-flagship-nyc-store-in-spring-new-one-coming-in-2019/ [https://perma.cc/X9GY-
AH66]. 
 167 See 28 U.S.C. § 1610 (stipulating the need for the property in question to be used for a com-
mercial activity); Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran (Rubin IV), 138 S. Ct. 816, 827 (2018) (holding 
that the property in question was not attachable because the state sponsor exception was not a free-
standing exception); Kirschenbaum v. 650 Fifth Ave., 257 F. Supp. 3d 463, 472, 527, 536 (S.D.N.Y. 
2017) (holding that the defendants violated the FSIA). In a written decision, Judge Katherine B. For-
rest of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York found that she was con-
vinced the Iranian government appointed and directed the day-to-day operators of the Atavi Founda-
tion to make sure the Foundation acted within the government’s interests. O’Flanagan, supra note 
165. 
 168 See 28 U.S.C. § 1610 (stipulating that property is eligible for attachment only if it used for a 
commercial activity); Rubin IV, 138 S. Ct. at 821 (describing what property the plaintiffs were trying 
to access); Rubin III, 830 F.3d at 473 (holding that the statute did not include a free-standing excep-
tion for property not used for a commercial activity); O’Flanagan, supra note 165 (discussing the 
commercial activity of a skyscraper in Manhattan). 
2019] Victims of State Sponsored Terrorism  1481 
tachment because they filed a claim under the state sponsor of terrorism excep-
tion.169 
The relative success of the 650 Fifth Avenue forfeiture only highlights the 
shortcomings of the system as a whole.170 There is a large plaintiff class be-
cause opportunities to compensate these victims from foreign sovereign coffers 
are so rare.171 Due to the size of the judgment and the number of victims who 
are seeking compensation, there will likely be a “special master” appointed 
like for the BNP Paribas SA and the September 11th funds.172 Finally, if histo-
ry is any indication, those victims who do receive some compensation from the 
fund are not likely to get what previous U.S. courts determined to be a fair 
amount.173 There is currently no other way for the judicial system to compen-
sate American victims of terror while using foreign sovereign funds.174 Due to 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Rubin IV, the courts will forever have one arm 
tied behind their backs, hindered by a limited ability to touch foreign sovereign 
property that is not used for commercial use.175 
                                                                                                                           
 169 28 U.S.C. § 1605A; Rubin III, 830 F.3d at 473; Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 24, at 24. 
 170 See Wang, supra note 163 (reporting that the victims in the group were able to receive some 
kind of compensation for their injuries, but after decades of work and will likely now be forced to 
compete for a finite amount of available money); supra notes 72–83 and accompanying text (exam-
ples of judiciary and legislative failures to fix the issues). 
 171 See Gates v. Syrian Arab Republic, 755 F.3d 568, 571 (7th Cir. 2014) (stating that the victims 
were forced to race each other), overruled by Rubin III, 830 F.3d 470 (7th Cir. 2016), aff’d, 138 S. Ct. 
816 (2018); Wang, supra note 163 (reporting on a group of plaintiffs gaining access to compensation, 
if there was easier access to compensation funds, there would be little incentive for victims to form 
such large groups and compete over a scarce and finite resource). 
 172 See BIRNBAUM, supra note 153 (detailing how funds were distributed for 9/11 first respond-
ers); September 11th Victim Aid and Compensation Fast Facts, supra note 145 (detailing how funds 
were distributed for 9/11 victims); Slobodzian, supra note 10 (reporting on the distribution of com-
pensation for U.S. victims of other Iranian government-sponsored terror attacks); Wang, supra note 
163 (describing how a case brings together many different groups of plaintiffs into a larger class). 
 173 See, e.g., Rubin IV, 138 S. Ct. at 820, 827 (holding that courts are now precluded from using 
subsection (g) on foreign sovereign-owned property unless it fits within another subsection of the 
FSIA); Rodriguez note 12, at 5–6 (reporting on 9/11 victims’ inability to be fully compensated from 
the fund Congress created); Slobodzian, supra note 10 (describing how a group of victims are not able 
to receive the full judgment). 
 174 See 29 U.S.C. § 1610(g) (providing a specific way for victims of terror to execute their judg-
ments); Broder, supra note 21 (describing an agreement between the U.S. and Sudanese governments 
that did not include any agreement about terrorist victim compensation); Birnbaum, supra note 153 
(reporting on another example of a common fund for victims); Libya Pays $1.5 Billion, supra note 70 
(describing how victims of the Lockerbie bombing were able to receive compensation after a diplo-
matic agreement between the U.S. and Libyan governments); September 11th Victim Aid and Com-
pensation Fast Facts, supra note 145 (describing how money is allocated through a common victim 
fund); Slobodzian, supra note 10 (describing how victims of Iranian-sponsored attacks eventually 
received compensation from a fund created by Congress using the forfeited money from the French 
bank BNA Paribas SA). 
 175 See 28 U.S.C. § 1610(g) (refusing to specify what kind of property is covered by the subsec-
tion); Rubin IV, 138 S. Ct. at 824–27 (ruling that Congress did not intend for the scope of eligible 
property to be as wide as the plaintiffs argued, even though Congress stated that it intended for 
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III. WHY THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD HAVE SIDED  
WITH THE RUBIN PLAINTIFFS 
The United States Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Rubin v. Islam-
ic Republic of Iran (Rubin IV) on December 4, 2017 and authored its decision 
on February 21, 2018.176 After hearing from the plaintiffs, the respondents, and 
the United States government, the Court had an opportunity to provide justice 
to victims who have long been denied compensation.177 Expanding the scope 
of § 1610(g) so that it covers property that was not used for a commercial ac-
tivity as defined in § 1610(a) and (b) not only would have fit within the correct 
statutory interpretation of the text and Congressional intent of the legislation, 
but also would have provided a path for future victims of terror without caus-
ing harm to other museums or academic institutions concerned about losing 
similar antiquities.178 
Subsection A details why the Supreme Court incorrectly interpreted the 
statute when deciding against the Rubin plaintiffs.179 Subsection B explains 
how this new ruling would have fixed many of the current issues facing vic-
tims of terror in their attempts to execute the judgments they have been award-
                                                                                                                           
§ 1610(g) to provide a significant amount of relief to victims who were struggling to find attachable 
property to satisfy their judgments); Rubin III, 830 F.3d at 484 (struggling to find a consistent under-
standing of Congress’s intent); Gates v. Syrian Arab Republic, 755 F.3d 568, 571 (7th Cir. 2014) 
(understanding the predicament both parties found themselves without any easy solution), overruled 
by Rubin III, 830 F.3d 470 (7th Cir. 2016), aff’d, 138 S. Ct. 816 (2018). 
 176 Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran (Rubin IV), 138 S. Ct. 816, 816 (2018). Asher Perlin argued 
on behalf of the plaintiffs, David A. Strauss argued on behalf of the respondents, and Assistant Solici-
tor General Zachary D. Tripp argued on behalf of the United States government as amicus curiae, 
supporting the respondents. Transcript of Oral Argument at 1, Rubin IV, 138 S. Ct. 816 (2018) (No. 
16-534), https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2017/16-534_if5n.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/GZ5T-5LWR]. 
 177 See Rubin IV, 138 S. Ct. 816 at 820–21 (detailing the procedural history of the case). The 
Foundation for Defense of Democracies, Victims of Iranian Terrorism, and a group representing for-
mer U.S. counterterrorism officials each filed a brief in support of the plaintiffs. Rubin v. Islamic 
Republic of Iran, SCOTUS BLOG (2018), http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/rubin-v-islamic-
republic-of-iran-2/ [https://perma.cc/L9GR-YCFC]. On the other side, both the government of Iran 
and the University of Chicago filed separate respondent briefs, while the United States’ government 
filed a supporting brief. Id. The Rubin plaintiffs were first injured in 1997, received a judgment in 
2005, and have spent the next decade plus seeking execution on this judgment. Campuzano v. Islamic 
Republic of Iran, 281 F. Supp. 2d 258, 261 (D.D.C. 2003); see Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran (Ru-
bin III), 830 F.3d 470, 473 (7th Cir. 2016) (explaining when the plaintiffs first received a judgment to 
compensate them for their injuries), aff’d, 138 S. Ct. 816 (2018); 7 Killed by Bomb Blasts in Jerusa-
lem, supra note 1 (reporting on the terrorist attack that caused the plaintiffs’ injuries). 
 178 See 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)–(b), (g) (2012) (exceptions for foreign sovereign immunity); H.R. 
REP. NO. 110-477, at 1001 (2007) (describing the intended scope of § 1610(g) and Congress’s efforts 
to smooth the process for victims); Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 24, at 28; Transcript of Oral Argu-
ment at 22, Rubin IV, 138 S. Ct. 816 (arguing that concerns over the future of foreign antiquities in the 
United States are overblown); see also infra notes 214–219 and accompanying text (explaining why 
expanding subsection (g) would not have negative consequences on foreign antiquities in the U.S.). 
 179 See infra notes 182–207. 
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ed.180 Finally, Subsection C addresses how an expanded § 1610(g) would have 
affected the future of foreign-owned antiquities in the United States, and ex-
plains why any fear that these objects would be lost permanently are out-
weighed by the benefits conferred to victims.181 
A. Statutory Justifications for Expanding § 1610(g) 
The debate between the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
and Ninth Circuits regarding the meaning of § 1610(g) could have been easily 
settled considering the Congressional intent of the statute and how it fits into 
the FSIA as a whole.182 According to the conference report, Congress meant 
for § 1610(g) to significantly expand the kind of property that victims could 
attach to execute judgments against state sponsors of terror.183 The legislature 
meant for this statute to be more than just a mechanism for victims to pierce 
the “corporate” veil of state-owned businesses and access assets that could be 
sold to satisfy the country’s debts.184 Congress did not mean for § 1610(g) to 
have any limitations.185 
                                                                                                                           
 180 See infra notes 203–213. 
 181 See infra notes 214–219. 
 182 Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 24, at 28; see Rubin III, 830 F.3d at 487 (holding that subsection 
(g) was restricted by the other subsections in the statute); Bennett v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 825 
F.3d 949, 959, 965 (9th Cir. Feb. 22, 2016) (holding that subsection (g) did not have any restrictions), 
abrogated by Rubin IV, 138 S. Ct. 816 (2018); infra note 183 (explaining the Congressional intent of 
the legislation). 
 183 See H.R. REP. NO. 110-477, at 1001 (stating that “§ 1610(g) is written to subject any property 
interest in which the foreign state enjoys a beneficial ownership to attachment and execution”). The 
Supreme Court did not lend proper weight to just how much Congress intended to expand the scope of 
eligible property through § 1610(g). See Rubin IV, 138 S. Ct. at 827 (minimizing the impact Congress 
intended the legislation to have). The Court did briefly consider congressional intent at the end of the 
Rubin opinion, but it misinterpreted how far Congress wanted to go. See id. (holding that Congress 
only wanted to eliminate the Bancec factors). Allowing all property to be attachable under a § 1605A 
claim through the correct interpretation of § 1610(g) would have significantly expanded the statute’s 
the scope, exactly what Congress intended. See Rubin IV, 138 S. Ct. at 827 (limiting the scope of 
subsection (g) to eliminating the Bancec factors); H.R. REP. NO. 110-477, at 1001 (discussing the 
intended scope of subsection (g)). 
 184 Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 24, at 27; see H.R. REP. NO. 110-477, at 1001 (applying subsec-
tion (g) to all property). Congress’s most recent amendment to the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act 
came in 2012 with the passage of JASTA. Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act, Pub. L. No. 
114-222, § 2(b), 130 Stat. 852 (2016); see supra notes 13–15 and accompanying text (briefly describ-
ing JASTA and its goals). In this amendment, Congress explicitly laid out its intent for the act as a 
whole when it stated: 
The purpose of this Act is to provide civil litigants with the broadest possible basis, 
consistent with the Constitution of the United States, to seek relief against persons, enti-
ties, and foreign countries, wherever acting and wherever they may be found, that have 
provided material support, directly or indirectly, to foreign organizations or persons that 
engage in terrorist activities against the United States. 
JASTA § 2(b). Piercing the corporate veil is a corporate law term that is applicable in this context, as 
well. See STEPHEN B. PRESSER, PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL § 1:1 (1998) (describing the ele-
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Multiple courts agreed with an assessment that the subsection in question 
covered all foreign-owned property, including the United States District Court 
for the District of Columbia and the Southern District of California, as well as 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and Seventh Circuit 
(prior to Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran (Rubin III)).186 The Seventh Circuit, 
however, came to an opposite conclusion in Rubin III, and the Supreme Court 
followed suit by upholding the decision.187 
                                                                                                                           
ments needed to pierce the veil of a corporation); Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 24, at 27 (discussing 
the legal veil of foreign sovereigns). In business, as in international diplomacy, it is important for 
owners to have limited liability. See PRESSER, supra (describing the role of the corporate veil in busi-
ness that parallels how the veil works with foreign sovereigns). If a business is held liable for its lia-
bilities, creditors cannot seek the owners’ independent and individual assets to fulfill the debts of the 
business. Id. It is only when the business and the owner are legally indistinguishable can someone 
pierce through the veil of the business to reach into the assets of the owner. Id. The same dynamic is 
present in international situations like the one facing the Rubin plaintiffs. See Petitioner’s Brief, supra 
note 24, at 27 (stating that § 1610(g) allows victims to pierce the “corporate” veil of foreign sovereign 
governments). 
 185 See H.R. REP. NO. 110-477, at 1001 (stating explicitly that § 1610(g) did not have any limita-
tions); Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 24, at 30–49, 58–61 (explaining the legislative background and 
textual particularities that indicate Congress intended § 1610(g) to have as broad a scope of attachable 
property as possible). The language of the statute does not modify what kind of property is eligible for 
attachment, a clear difference from other sections which expressly define the scope of property avail-
able to plaintiffs. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1610(b) (stating that “any property in the United States of an 
agency or instrumentality of a foreign state engaged in commercial activity in the United States shall 
not be immune from attachment”), with § 1610(g) (stating that “the property of a foreign state against 
which a judgment is entered under section 1605A . . . is subject to attachment”). 
 186 Bennett, 825 F.3d at 960; Wyatt v. Syrian Arab Republic, 800 F.3d 331 (7th Cir. 2015) (allow-
ing plaintiffs to attach Syrian government debts held by a U.S. bank and telecommunications compa-
ny), overruled by Rubin III, 830 F.3d 470 (7th Cir. 2016), aff’d, 138 S. Ct. 816 (2018); Gates v. Syrian 
Arab Republic, 755 F.3d 568, 576 (7th Cir. 2014), overruled by Rubin III, 830 F.3d 470 (7th Cir. 
2016), aff’d, 138 S. Ct. 816 (2018); Ministry of Def. & Support for the Armed Forces v. Cubic Def. 
Sys., 984 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1082 (S.D. Cal. 2013) (finding that Congress included § 1610(g) to allow 
victims of state sponsored terror attacks to attach foreign sovereign-owned property in the United 
States), aff’d sub nom. Ministry of Def. and Support for the Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran v. Frym, 814 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2016); Estate of Heiser v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 807 F. Supp. 
2d 9, 11, 18 (D.D.C. 2011) (ruling that decedents for nineteen U.S. military members who were killed 
in a 1996 tanker truck explosion in Saudi Arabia received a judgment by filing an attachment against 
Iranian debts held by Sprint, which did not contest that § 1610(g) covered the property in question); 
Calderon-Cardona v. Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, 723 F. Supp. 2d 441, 458 (D.P.R. 
2010) (deciding that § 1610(g) provided easier paths for enforcement of § 1605A judgments). In the 
Rubin decision, the Seventh Circuit admitted that the prior decisions assumed the question at issue 
here. Rubin III, 830 F.3d at 485. The Seventh Circuit in Gates v. Syrian Arab Republic did not feel it 
was necessary to even discuss the scope of § 1610(g), seemingly because it was so obvious it was not 
worth the time. See generally, 755 F.3d 568 (accepting that § 1610(g) had a broad scope). Further-
more, Judge Lamberth, who authored the Estate of Heiser v. Islamic Republic of Iran decision, wrote 
that “Congress made no exceptions” to the reach of § 1610(g). Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 24, at 28 
(citing Estate of Heiser, 807 F. Supp. 2d at 21). 
 187 Rubin IV, 138 S. Ct. at 820, 827; Rubin III, 830 F.3d at 487. 
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An expansive reading of § 1610(g) is made even stronger when one ex-
amines the subsection in the context of the FSIA as a whole.188 Other parts of 
§ 1610, specifically subsection (a), specifies what kind of property is covered 
by that individual subsection.189 On the other hand, § 1610(g) does no such 
thing.190 The word “property” is not modified by any phrases or words meant 
to limit its scope.191 Furthermore, parts of subsection (g) specifically expand 
the scope of property available to victims by eliminating the restrictions that 
had been in place with the Bancec factors described above.192 One of those 
factors in particular, § 1610(g)(1)(C), allows for property to be attached re-
gardless of the amount of control that the foreign state exerts over the daily 
affairs of the item in question.193 Because of the blanket treatment of property 
in § 1610(g), every other section of § 1610, specifically subsections (a) and 
(b), should not be considered applicable.194 If the foreign government needed 
to use the property in question for a commercial activity (a kind of control de-
fined in subsection (a)) in order to be stripped of foreign sovereign immunity, 
then it would render subsection (g)(1)(C) irrelevant, because that specifically 
addressed whether any type of control needed to be present.195 
                                                                                                                           
 188 Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 24, at 31–36. 
 189 Id. at 31. According to § 1610(a), property that would be excluded under that subsection must 
(i) be used (ii) by the foreign sovereign state itself, (iii) for some kind of commercial activity, (iv) in 
the United States, and also if one of the other enumerated exceptions applies. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1610(a)(1)–(7). 
 190 See 28 U.S.C. § 1610(g) (omitting any limitations to kinds of eligible property). 
 191 Id. 
 192 Id. § 1610(g)(1)(A)–(E); Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 24, at 32; see supra note 184 (describ-
ing the corporate veil dynamic addressed by the statute). The Supreme Court pointed out this differ-
ence as a reason to rule against the plaintiffs, when it should have come to the opposite conclusion. 
See Rubin IV, 138 S. Ct. at 827 (limiting the scope of (g) to the Bancec factors). By not modifying the 
word “property,” Congress signified its intent for all property to be attachable under § 1610(g). See 28 
U.S.C. § 1610(g) (specifically leaving “property” un-modified, without any specifications about what 
kind should or should not be covered); H.R. REP. NO. 110-477, at 1001 (indicating an intent for 
§ 1610(g) to reach “any” foreign sovereign property interest). Up until 2008, courts used five factors 
outlined in its 1983 Bancec decision to determine if property could be attachable under a claim related to 
a state sponsored terrorist attack. Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 24, at 13. Bancec created a general pre-
sumption that foreign-owned property would not be attached to execute a judgment if it was owned by a 
“juridically separate agency or instrumentality.” Rubin III, 830 F.3d at 482. The NDAA, specifically 
§ 1610(g)(1)(A)–(E), eliminated each of the five factors. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(g)(1)(A)–(E); Rubin IV, 
138 S. Ct. at 827. 
 193 28 U.S.C. § 1610(g)(1)(C); Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 24, at 32–33; see Rubin IV, 138 S. 
Ct. at 820, 827 (holding that § 1610(g) does not cover all kinds of property). The same argument goes 
for other parts of § 1610(g)(1), as well. Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 24, at 33 (arguing that § 1610(b) 
has similar problems). Section 1610(g)(1)(A) specifies that property can be attached regardless of the 
level of economic control that the foreign state possesses, while § 1610(g)(1)(B) does away with the 
requirement that profits from the property must go to the foreign government itself. 28 U.S.C. 
§ 610(g)(1)(A)–(B); Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 24, at 33. 
 194 Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 24, at 33; see infra note 199 (explaining why any other interpre-
tation would make the language of subsection (g) meaningless). 
 195 Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 24, at 33 
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Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit and Supreme Court’s interpretation of 
§ 1610(g) cannot be reconciled with the language and structure of § 1610(b).196 
Section 1610(g) allows for plaintiffs to seek an attachment on property owned 
by an agent or instrumentality of a foreign state whether or not the agent itself 
waived foreign sovereign immunity.197 Section 1610(b), on the other hand, 
specifies that property owned by an agent or instrumentality of a foreign state 
can only be attached if it was used for a commercial activity and if the agent or 
instrumentality itself did something that stripped immunity.198 Again, if, as the 
Seventh Circuit held in Rubin IV and the Supreme Court reaffirmed, any 
§ 1610(g) claim on foreign-owned property needed to also satisfy the “com-
mercial activity” requirement elsewhere in § 1610, then subsection (g) would 
be completely subsumed and nullified.199 
A foreign government that knows U.S. courts have levied judgments 
against them for sponsoring acts of terror could use this construction to perma-
nently shelter their money from the victims trying to get compensation.200 
They would simply keep their money in some agent or instrumentality—like a 
bank—that is not owned by the country nor is independently guilty of doing 
                                                                                                                           
 196 Id. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1610(b) (stating that “any property in the United States of an agency 
or instrumentality of a foreign state engaged in commercial activity in the United States shall not be 
immune from attachment”), with § 1610(g) (stating that “the property of a foreign state against which 
a judgment is entered under section 1605A . . . is subject to attachment”). 
 197 Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 24, at 34; see 28 U.S.C. § 1610(g) (failing to specify any limits 
to the kind of property eligible to be attached in a § 1605A claim). 
 198 Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 24, at 34. Along with the commercial activity requirement, 
§ 1610(b) stipulates that the agent or instrumentality must have waived its immunity in some way or that 
the agent or instrumentality is not immune under § 1605(a)–(b) or § 1605A. § 1610(b); Petitioner’s Brief, 
supra note 24, at 34. Both § 1610(a)(7) and (b)(3) specify that § 1605A judgments are also included 
under the commercial property exemption from attachment immunity. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(7), (b)(3). 
That does not, however, mean that § 1610(g) should be limited to that requirement, as well. Petitioner’s 
Brief, supra note 24, at 41. Expanding the scope of subsection (g) to all property in § 1605A judgments 
would not make (a)(7) and (b)(3) superfluous because those subsections also include judgments from 
§ 1605(a)(7)—the old version of state sponsored terrorism that was replaced by § 1605A. Id. 
 199 Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 24, at 34. The requirements of § 1610(b) cover all kinds of prop-
erty that are supposedly opened up by § 1610(g). 28 U.S.C. § 1610(b), (g); Petitioner’s Brief, supra 
note 24, at 36. By limiting the scope of § 1610(g), plaintiffs are required to prove that the agent of the 
foreign government that owns the property is also liable for the claim. Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 
24, at 34. Section 1610(b)(3) specifies that property of an agent may be attached if the agent itself is 
not immune due to a § 1605A claim. § 1610(b)(3); Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 24, at 34. Therefore, 
the plaintiffs need to prove that the agent itself was independently liable for the § 1605A claim. Peti-
tioner’s Brief, supra note 24, at 34. This eliminates the point of voiding the Bancec factors because 
that action was meant to allow the plaintiffs to pierce the veil of the instrumentality due to the foreign 
government’s actions, not the actions of the agent itself. Id. 
 200 See Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 24, at 34 (arguing that the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation of 
(g) requires that the agent of a foreign government also needs to be proven liable). The Supreme Court 
failed to address this loophole in its decision. See generally Rubin IV, 138 S. Ct. 816 (ruling on the 
scope of § 1610(g) without addressing the consequences of its decision). 
2019] Victims of State Sponsored Terrorism  1487 
anything that would strip foreign sovereign immunity from itself.201 This statu-
tory interpretation would create an loophole for foreign sovereign states and 
leave plaintiffs with few options to recoup their damages.202 
B. Practical Justifications for Expanding § 1610(g) 
There is no reason to value the immunity of a country that provides mate-
rial and financial support to terrorist organizations over the interests of Ameri-
can victims of terror.203 Section 1610(g) of the FSIA was the last and best hope 
                                                                                                                           
 201 See supra note 198 (describing the loophole in the Court’s understanding of the statute). This 
is exactly what happened with the Bennett v. Islamic Republic of Iran, as Visa owed the government 
of Iran money that the Bennett plaintiffs were trying to attach to satisfy their judgments relating to 
damages from Iranian-sponsored terrorist attacks. 825 F.3d at 957. The Iranian government argued 
that the plaintiffs could not collect the money because Visa itself had done nothing wrong, therefore 
not fulfilling the prongs of § 1610(b), which would have caused the § 1610(g) claim to fail. Petition-
er’s Brief, supra note 24, at 34–35. 
 202 See Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 24, at 34–36 (arguing that plaintiffs would have to find both 
the government and the instrumentality liable). 
 203 See Danica Curavic, Compensating Victims of Terrorism or Frustrating Cultural Diplomacy? 
The Unintended Consequences of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act’s Terrorism Provisions, 43 
CORNELL INT’L L. J. 381, 398–99 (2010) (arguing that certain studies of the FSIA indicate it may not 
provide much deterrence). Studies examining the effect of the FSIA on the behavior of other countries 
are at best inconclusive. See id. (arguing that some studies do not conclusively show a decline in state 
sponsored terrorism activity). Though a 2006 report by the National Counterterrorism Center found a 
global decrease in state sponsored terrorism, two notable exceptions to this trend are Iran and Syria 
(two countries that appear frequently in foreign sovereign property cases involving § 1605A claims). 
Id. Finding that the FSIA has not deterred state sponsorship of terrorism could lead some, including 
Professor Curavic, to conclude that the statutory framework is not working. See id. at 401 (arguing in 
favor of a new strategy to fight international terrorism). It could also lead others to conclude that the 
protection of culturally significant property prior to the NDAA in 2008 did nothing to change the 
calculus of state sponsored terrorism. See id. at 398–99 (describing how Iran and Syria’s behavior had 
not changed with the FSIA). It is tempting to argue in favor of protecting property like the artifacts in 
the Persepolis Collection, but the benefit of attaching this property to the Rubin plaintiffs is quantifia-
ble and real, while the potential benefits of protecting the Collection due to an abstract notion of “cul-
tural diplomacy” is difficult to quantify and has proven to be ineffective. See Rubin IV, 138 S. Ct. at 
820, 827 (refusing to provide the plaintiffs with an easy way to execute their judgment); Curavic, 
supra, at 398–99 (debating how effective the FSIA has been in deterring state sponsored terrorist 
attacks). 
 Furthermore, the importance of protecting foreign sovereign immunity through the FSIA has 
been overstated. See Adam S. Chilton & Christopher A. Whytock, Foreign Sovereign Immunity and 
Comparative Institutional Competence, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 411, 434–46 (2015) (examining the varia-
bility in the application of foreign sovereign immunity across different countries and circumstances). 
The FSIA has not uniformly protected all countries eligible for immunity. Id. at 446–47. Instead, U.S. 
district courts have granted immunity based on a number of factors beyond the letter of the law, in-
cluding legal and political considerations. Id. at 447. Whether a given country has a large amount of 
commercial activity and contracts with the United States, is a democracy, or is a member of the Or-
ganization for Economic Co-operation and Development influences the likelihood that it will receive 
immunity. Id. at 447, 459. By considering a number of extraneous factors like the ones mentioned 
above, the universal and automatic application of foreign sovereign immunity loses its importance. 
See id. (arguing that other factors are also considered when deciding whether or not to grant immuni-
ty). If the U.S. court system considers factors like the kind of government, it should also consider the 
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for victims to hold their assailants accountable for their actions.204 It is futile to 
wait for diplomatic agreements that only come when a variety of independent 
factors convene that coincidentally benefit victims.205 Furthermore, even if any 
kind of relief could come under the current state of affairs—whether from an 
agreement, a common fund set up by donations and American taxpayers, or 
some kind of executable judgment against a foreign state—the victims would 
be forced to either fight amongst themselves or would be locked into a fixed 
compensation scheme that would not cover the true amount of damages to 
which they are legally entitled.206 
By expanding the scope of eligible property under § 1610(g), the Su-
preme Court could have gone a long way towards alleviating this dynamic.207 
                                                                                                                           
effect on victims of terror attacks. See id. (arguing that it considers factors beyond what is stipulated 
in the law). 
 204 See Rubin III, 830 F.3d at 487 (contradicting prior precedent and another circuit court’s deci-
sion about the same statutory language); Gates, 755 F.3d at 570 (concerning two groups of U.S. vic-
tims of different Iranian-sponsored terrorist attacks suing each other for access to limited resources 
meant to cover related judgments); Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran (Rubin II), 709 F.3d 49, 51 (1st 
Cir. 2013) (describing the other attempts the Rubin plaintiffs to execute their judgment); Bradley, 
supra note 12 (describing how the Trump Administration brokered a deal with the Sudanese govern-
ment that lifted sanctions in exchange for policies moving away from supporting terror organizations 
without addressing pending judgments for U.S. victims of Sudanese-sponsored terrorist attacks); 
Broder, supra note 21 (explaining how the U.S. government paid back money to Iran rather than use it 
to execute the judgments for victims of Iranian-sponsored terror attacks); Rodriguez, supra note 12, at 
5–7 (reporting how congressionally created compensation pools like the 9/11 victims’ fund were inef-
fective). 
 205 Bradley, supra note 12 (theorizing why victims of Sudanese-sponsored terrorist attacks were 
not included in the diplomatic agreement between the United States and Sudan, specifically noting 
reports indicating that Sudan had agreed to enforce U.N. sanctions against North Korea); Libya Pays 
$1.5 Billion, supra note 70 (describing all the interests that helped push the agreement between the 
United States and Libya to completion). 
 206 See Gates, 755 F.3d at 570 (resolving a dispute between different victims of terrorist attacks); 
Rodriguez, supra note 12, at 5–6 (reporting that there was not enough money in the 9/11 funds to fully 
compensate everyone). It is telling that Kenneth Feinberg, the administrator of many different victim 
compensation funds, openly advocated for fixed compensation schemes where every victim with the 
same kind of injury receives the same amount of money, regardless of their claims. Rodriguez, supra 
note 12, at 5–6. This demonstrates how difficult and unpleasant it is for victims to fight for their piece 
of the pie and for any person to decide who gets what at the expense of others. See id. at 6 (describing 
how difficult it was to decide one claimant would get more compensation than their neighbor). Fur-
thermore, the system for which he advocates has its own deficiencies. See id. (describing how not 
everybody is going to be affected the same, even if they both had the same kind of injury). Additional-
ly, it is uncommon for two people who are each injured in a terrorist attack to receive the exact same 
kind of injury. See Campuzano v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 281 F. Supp. 2d 258, 263–67 (D.D.C. 
2003) (describing the different injuries suffered by the Ben Yehuda victims). Each of the nine Rubin 
plaintiffs who were injured in the Ben Yehuda bomb blast received different physical, emotional, and 
psychological injuries. Id. It would be futile and unfair to try and group all of them into discrete cate-
gories so that the money could be distributed “fairly.” See id. (describing how some have suffered 
more severe injuries than others). 
 207 See generally Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 24 (describing how the plaintiffs would have easi-
er access to funds without having to compete with one another). 
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With more opportunities to execute these judgments, victims would not have to 
rely on diplomatic agreements and would have a much better chance of receiv-
ing fair compensation in a timely manner.208 Not only would the timeline be 
shortened, but the amount of money that individual victims could recover 
would likely increase.209 Rather than waiting years to receive a fraction of 
what they are owed, victims could be paid quickly and in full by those respon-
sible for their damages.210 
Expanding § 1610(g) would have provided a valuable lifeline to victims 
and would also have relieved American diplomats of a potentially restrictive 
burden.211 The diplomatic agreements with Libya, Iran, and Sudan demonstrate 
how difficult it is to balance the interests of American victims on one hand 
with the international interests of the country on the other.212 If victims could 
more easily use the judicial system to receive compensation for their injuries, 
they would not be forced to rely on diplomatic negotiations where they can be 
reduced to an after-thought.213 
C. Effects of an Expanded § 1610(g) on Museums and Research Institutions 
During oral argument, the Supreme Court raised a concern about what a 
decision in favor of the Rubin plaintiffs would mean for the study and display 
of foreign antiquities in the United States.214 The situation, however, is not as 
dire as it appears.215 Courts have the ability to dictate the terms of any sale of 
attached property, so it is possible that whoever purchases the Persepolis Col-
                                                                                                                           
 208 See id. at 26 (arguing that Congress intended § 1610(g) to eliminate obstacles barring Ameri-
can victims of state sponsored terror from enforcing judgments against foreign sovereigns). 
 209 See Slobodzian, supra note 10 (reporting that no individual victim who filed a claim in the 
BNP Paribas SA fund could receive more than $20 million and no family could receive more than $35 
million). 
 210 See Rubin IV, 138 S. Ct. at 821 (describing the judicial path the plaintiffs took). See generally 
Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 24 (explaining how this would be possible). 
 211 See Bradley, supra note 12 (describing how the U.S. government chose diplomacy over justice 
for victims); Rodriguez, supra note 12, at 5–6 (describing the difficulty victims of 9/11 faced receiv-
ing compensation). 
 212 See Broder, supra note 21 (reporting that U.S. diplomats justified their decision to pay back 
the money to Iran by framing it as a bargain because Iran could have gone after more money in an 
international claim tribunal); Harris, supra note 21 (speculating that the Trump Administration did not 
pay close attention to the Sudan deal because its attention had been elsewhere in international diplo-
macy); Libya Pays $1.5 Billion, supra note 70 (disclosing that U.S. diplomats considered the wishes 
of the U.S. business community when coming to an agreement with the Libyan government). 
 213 See Bradley, supra note 12 (arguing that the Trump Administration did not take advantage of 
the leverage it had to make Sudan pay damages to victims of state sponsored terror); supra note 128 
(recounting how victims of terror have found mixed success in receiving compensation through di-
plomacy). 
 214 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 16–17, Rubin IV, 138 S. Ct. 816 (No. 16-534) (asking 
about the property rights of the University of Chicago museum). 
 215 See infra note 216–219 (describing how there is little danger of property rights surrounding 
foreign antiquities significantly changing by ruling in favor of an expansive subsection (g)). 
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lection could be obligated to house the objects at the University of Chicago, or 
a similar institution, in an arrangement analogous to the one today.216 
Furthermore, it is possible that the Iranian government may decide to re-
move the Collection from the University regardless of the outcome in Rubin 
IV.217 The University does not own the Collection and does not have any say 
about its location, no matter how the Court would have ruled.218 Without any 
true ownership rights, the University’s concerns are a secondary consideration 
at best, especially in the face of innocent American victims trying to end a dec-
ades-long struggle to receive compensation for their injuries.219 
CONCLUSION 
Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran (Rubin IV) provided the United States 
Supreme Court with a unique opportunity to make a positive and lasting im-
pact on the lives of innocent Americans who had the misfortune of being in the 
wrong place at the wrong time. There have been many attempts to help Ameri-
can victims of terrorist attacks without much success. Each effort—whether it 
be from the executive, legislative, or judicial branch—has fallen short due to 
competing interests, imprecise language, and resource scarcity. Innocent Amer-
icans, today and in the future, would have finally found justice if the Court had 
adopted the correct statutory interpretation and understood how this case fit 
into the greater landscape of victim compensation. Unfortunately, the Court let 
the opportunity slip through its grasp. Victims must now continue their inter-
minable search for a fair outcome, without any realistic hopes in sight. 
SAM DOUGHERTY 
                                                                                                                           
 216 Transcript of Oral Argument at 5–13, 17, Rubin IV, 138 S. Ct. 816 (No. 16-534). 
 217 Id. at 13–21. 
 218 Id. at 3–5, 18. In a previous attempt to attach Iranian property, the Iranian government took 
back control over the disputed items and returned them to Iran. Id. at 13–21. The Iranian government 
effectively closed off these items as a way to execute their judgment and is something it could do 
again with the Persepolis Collection. See id. (implying that the same fate could befall the Persepolis 
Collection because of its similarities with other items that Iran has taken back). 
 219 See id. (arguing that concerns over the future of foreign-owned antiquities in the United States 
are overblown). It is also possible that the safest place for the Persepolis Collection is anywhere but in 
the hands of the Iranian government, making attachment an even more attractive option. Speichert, 
supra note 85, at 590, n. 277. Governments in Iran and Afghanistan have failed to protect anthropo-
logical sites from being attacked or destroyed. Id. (citing Alicia M. Hilton, Terror Victims at the Mu-
seum Gates: Testing the Commercial Activity Exception Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 
53 VILL. L. REV. 479, 484 (2008)). 
